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Abstract We introduceBLADE, a new approach to au-
tomatically and efficiently synthesizing provably correct
repairs for transient execution vulnerabilities like Spectre.
BLADE is built on the insight that to stop speculative
execution attacks, it suffices to cut the dataflow from
expressions that speculatively introduce secrets (sources)
to those that leak them through the cache (sinks), rather
than prohibiting speculation altogether.We formalize this
insight in a static type sytem that (1) types each expression
as either transient, i.e., possibly containing speculative
secrets or as being stable, and (2) prohibits speculative
leaks by requiring that all sink expressions are stable.
We introduce protect, a new abstract primitive for fine
grained speculation control that can be implemented via
existing architectural mechanisms, and show how our type
system can automatically synthesize a minimal number
of protect calls needed to ensure the program is secure.
We evaluate BLADE by using it to repair several verified,
yet vulnerable WebAssembly implementations of cryp-
tographic primitives. BLADE can fix existing programs
that leak via speculation automatically, without user in-
tervention, and efficiently using two orders of magnitude
fewer fences than would be added by existing compilers,
and thereby ensuring security with minimal performance
overhead.
1 Introduction
Implementing secure cryptographic algorithms is hard.
The code must not only be functionally correct, mem-
ory safe, and efficient, it must also avoid divulging se-
crets indirectly through side channels like control-flow,
memory-access patterns, or execution time. Consequently,
much recent work focuses on how to ensure implementa-
tions do not leak secrets e.g., via type systems [12, 43],
verification[4], and program transformations [6].
Unfortunately, these efforts are foiled by speculative
execution. Even if secrets are closely controlled via guards
and access checks, the processor can simply ignore those
checks when executing speculatively. Even though these
speculative windows are short, an attacker can exploit
them to leak secrets in turn.
In principle, memory fences block speculation, and
hence, offer a way to recover the original security guar-
antees. In practice, however, fences pose a confounding
dilemma. Programmers can restore security by conserva-
tively inserting fences after every load, but then endure
the huge performance costs. Alternatively, they can rely
on heuristic approaches for inserting fences [41], but forgo
guarantees about the absence of side-channels. Since miss-
ing even only one fence can allow an attacker to leak
the whole process memory, Chrome isolates web sites in
different processes to avoid the risk altogether [9].
In this paper, we introduce BLADE, a new, fully au-
tomatic approach to provably and efficiently eliminate
speculation-based leakage. BLADE is based on the key
insight that to prevent leaking data via speculative execu-
tion, it is unnecessary to stop all speculation as done by
traditional memory fences. Instead, it suffices to cut the
data flow from expressions (sources) that speculatively
introduce secrets to those that leak them through the
cache (sinks). We develop this insight into an automatic
enforcement algorithm via four contributions.
1. A Semantics for Speculation. Our first contribu-
tion is a formal operational semantics for a simple While
language, inspired by a previous formal model of a spec-
ulative and out-of-order processor [13]. Our semantics
captures the essence of speculation-based attacks by mod-
eling precisely how speculation can occur and what an
attacker can observe via speculation (§ 3). To prevent leak-
age, we propose and formalize the semantics of an abstract
primitive called protect that captures the essence of sev-
eral hardware mechanisms proposed in recent work [2, 36].
Crucially, and in contrast to a regular fence which stops
all speculation, protect only stops speculation for a
given variable. For example x :=protect(e) ensures that
𝑒’s value is only assigned to 𝑥 after 𝑒 has been assigned
its stable, non-speculative value. Ideally and in the long
run, protect should be implemented in hardware. How-
ever commodity processors do not support fine grained
control of speculation, therefore, as a short term solution,
we implement protect in software via speculative load
hardening (SLH) [11].
2. A Type System for Speculation.Our second contri-
bution is an approach to conservatively approximating the
dynamic semantics of speculation via a static type sytem
that types each expression as either transient (T), i.e.,
expressions that may contain speculative secrets, or stable
(S), i.e., those that cannot (§ 4.1). Our system prohibits
speculative leaks by requiring that all sink expressions
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that can influence intrinsic attacker visible behavior (e.g.,
cache addresses) are typed as stable. In fact, the type sys-
tem does not rely on user-provided security annotations
to identify sensitive sources and public sinks. Instead, our
system conservatively rejects programs that exhibit any
flow of information from transient sources to stable sinks,
and therefore can detect speculative vulnerabilities also in
legacy unannotated cryptographic code. We connect the
static and dynamic semantics by proving that well-typed
programs are indeed secure (Âğ 5), i.e., satisfy a cor-
rectness condition called speculative non-interference [18]
which states that the program does not leak under spec-
ulative execution more than it would under sequential
execution.
3. Automatic Protection. Existing programs that are
free of protect statements are likely insecure under
speculation and will be rejected by our type system. Thus,
our third contribution is an algorithm that automati-
cally synthesizes a minimal number of protect state-
ments to ensure that the program satisfies speculative
non-interference (Âğ 4.2). To this end, we extend the type
checker to construct a def-use graph that captures the
data-flow between program expressions. The presence of
a path from transient sources to stable sinks in the graph
indicates a potential speculative leak in the program. To
repair the program, we only need to identify a cut-set,
a set of variables whose removal eliminates all the leaky
paths in the graph. We show that inserting a protect
statement for each variable in a cut-set suffices to yield
a program that is well-typed, and hence, secure with re-
spect to speculation (§5.3). Happily, finding such cuts
is an instance of the classic max-flow/min-cut problem,
so existing polynomial time algorithms let us efficiently
synthesize protect statements that resolve the dilemma
of enforcing security withminimal performance overhead.
4. Evaluation. Our final contribution is an implementa-
tion of our method in a fully automatic push-a-button tool
called BLADE, and an evaluation using BLADE to re-
pair verified yet vulnerable (to transient execution attacks)
programs: the WebAssembly implementations of the sig-
nal messaging Protocol and its respective cryptographic
libraries [32], and a number of verified cryptographic al-
gorithms from [42] (§ 6). WebAssembly (WASM) is an
attractive language for writing efficient and secure imple-
mentation of cryptographic algorithms because WASM
code runs at near native speed, it is portable, and validated,
and hence immune to classic stack-smashing attacks [19].
Even though BLADE operates on WASM code, we be-
lieve that our approach can scale to other programming
languages as well. Our evaluation shows that BLADE
can automatically compute fixes for existing programs
without requiring user annotations. Compared to an exist-
ing fully automatic protection as implemented in existing
1 void SHA2_update_last(int *input_len, ...)
2 {
3 if (! valid(input_len)) { ... }
4 int len = *input_len;
5 int *dst3 = ... + len;
6 int *dst3 = protect(.. + len);
7 ...
8 *dst3 = pad;
9 ...
10 }
Figure 1. Code fragment from the HACL* SHA2 imple-
mentation, containing a potential speculative execution
vulnerability that leaks explicitly through the cache by
writing memory at a secret-tainted address (line 8). The
patch computed by BLADE is shown in green.
compilers (notably Clang), BLADE inserts without user
intervention two orders of magnitude fewer fences and
thus imposes negligible performance overhead.
2 Overview
In this section, we present two potential speculative ex-
ecution vulnerabilities in HACL*— a verified crypto-
graphic library — that were discovered by BLADE and
discuss how BLADE repairs the vulnerabilities by insert-
ing protect statements. We then show how BLADE
computes the repairs via our minimal fence inference al-
gorithm and finally how BLADE proves that the repairs
are indeed correct, via our transient-flow type system.
2.1 Two Speculation Bugs and Their Fixes
Figure 1 shows a code fragment from a function in the
implementation of the SHA2 hash in HACL*. Though
BLADE operates onWebAssembly, we present equivalent
simplified C code for readability. The function takes as
input a pointer input_len, validates the input (line 3),
loads from memory the public length of the hash (line 4),
calculates a target address dst3 (line 5), and finally pads
the buffer pointed to by dst3 (line 8).
1. Leaking Through a Memory Write. During nor-
mal, sequential execution this code is not a problem: the
function validates the input to prevent classic buffer over-
flows vulnerabilities. However, an attacker can exploit
the function to leak sensitive data during speculation. To
do this, the attacker first has to modify the value that
the pointer input_len holds during speculation. Since
input_len is a function parameter, this can be achieved
e.g., by calling the function repeatedly with legitimate ad-
dresses, training the branch predictor to predict the next
input to be valid. After (mis)training the branch predic-
tor, the attacker manipulates input_len to point to an
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address containing secret data (e.g., the secret key used by
the hash function) and calls the function again, this time
with an invalid pointer. As a result of the mistraining, the
branch predictor causes the processor to skip validation
and erroneously load the secret into len, which in turn, is
used to calculate pointer dst3. The buffer pointed to by
dst3 is then written in line 8, completing the attack. Even
though pointer dst3 is incorrect due tomisprediction and
the write will therefore be squashed, its side-effects persist,
and therefore remain visible to the attacker. The attacker
can then extract the target address — and thereby the
secret — via cache timing measurements [17].
Preventing the Attack: Memory Fences. Since the
attack exploits the fact that input validation is specula-
tively skipped, we can prevent it by making sure that the
buffer in line 8 is not written until the input has been
validated. To mitigate these class of attacks, Intel [21] and
AMD [5] recommend inserting a speculation barrier after
critical validation check-points. Following this strategy,
we would place a memory fence right before line 8. This
fence would stop all speculative execution past the fence,
i.e., no statements after the fence are executed until all
previous statements (including input validation) have
been completed. While the effects of the fence prevent the
attack, they are more restrictive than necessary and incur
high performance cost [37].
Preventing the Attack Efficiently.We propose an al-
ternative way to stop speculation from reaching the write
in line 8 through a new primitive called protect. Rather
than eliminate all speculation, protect only stops spec-
ulation along a particular data-path. We use protect to
patch the program in line 6. Instead of assigning pointer
dst3 directly as in line 5, the expression that computes
the address is guarded by a protect statement. This en-
sures that the value assigned todst3 is always guaranteed
to use len’s final, nonspeculative value. Therefore, writ-
ing to dst3 in line 8 prevents any invalid secret-tainted
address from speculatively reaching the store, where it
could be leaked to the attacker.
Implementation of protect. Our protect primitive
provides an abstract interface for fine grained control
of speculation. This approach is promising because it
can eliminate speculation-based leaks precisely and only
when needed (indeed a similar API has been proposed
in [33]). However, whether protect can eliminate leaks
with tolerable runtime overhead depends on its concrete
implementation.
Ideally and in the long run, protect should be im-
plemented in hardware. Unfortunately existing proces-
sors provide only coarse grained control over speculation
throughmemory fence instructions. Nevertheless, recently
proposed microprocessor designs [2, 36] provide new hard-
ware mechanisms to control speculation, which suggests
1 void SHA2_update_last(int *input_len,...)
2 {
3 if (! valid(input_len)) { ... }
4 int len = protect(*input_len);
5 ...
6 for ( i = 0; i < len + ...)
7 dst2[i] = 0;
8 ...
9 }
Figure 2. SHA2 code fragment containing a potential
speculative execution vulnerability that leaks implicitly
through a control-flow dependency. The patch computed
by BLADE is shown in green.
that protect could be implemented efficiently in hard-
ware in the future.
Alternatively, protect could be implemented in soft-
ware and some software mitigations already exist [35].
However, the adoption of these solutions is challenging
because they require some cooperation between a mod-
ified operating system, the compiler and the hardware, as
well as explicit annotations for secret data. Instead, we
propose a self-contained software-only solution based on
Speculative Load Hardening (SLH), a software mitigation
deployed in the code generated by Clang [11]. At a high
level, SLH closes speculative leaks by stalling individual ar-
ray reads until the corresponding bounds-check condition
gets resolved. To support our proposal, we formalize the
ideal hardware-based and the software SLH-based seman-
tics of protect (Âğ3.4) and prove that both primitives
can eliminate speculation-based leaks. Then, we evalu-
ate how many hardware-based and SLH-based protect
statements are needed to patch HACL* and measure the
runtime performance overhead of the software implemen-
tation of protect in Section 6.
2. Leaking Through a Control-Flow Dependency.
Figure 2 shows a code fragment taken from the same func-
tion as in Figure 1. The code contains a second potential
vulnerability, but in contrast to Figure 1 the vulnerability
leaks secrets implicitly, through a control-flow depen-
dency.
The function reads from memory a (public) integer
len (line 4), which determines the number of initializa-
tion rounds in the condition of the for-loop (line 6). Like
the previous vulnerability, the function is harmless under
sequential execution, but leaks under speculation. As be-
fore, the attacker manipulates the pointer input_len to
point to a secret after mistraining the branch predictor to
skip validation. But instead of leaking the secret directly
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through the data cache, the attacker can leak the value in-
directly through a control-flow dependency, e.g., via the in-
struction cache and non-secret dependent lines of the data
cache. In particular, the secret determines how often the
initialization loop (line 6) is executed during speculation,
and therefore an attacker can make secret dependent ob-
servations via instruction- and data-cache timing attacks.
Like in the previous example, BLADE eliminates the
vulnerability by placing a protect statement in line 4.
2.2 Computing
Fixes Via Minimal Fence Inference
BLADE automatically infers the placement of these
protect statements. We illustrate this process using a
simple running example Ex1 shown in Figure 3.The code
reads two values from an array (x :=a[i1] and y :=a[i2]),
adds them (z :=x+y), and indexes another array with the
result (w :=b[z ]). We assume that all array operations are
implicitly bounds-checked and thus no explicit validation
code is needed.
Like the examples above, Ex1 contains a speculative
execution vulnerability: the array reads may skip their
bounds check and so x and y can contain transient secrets
(i.e., secrets introduced by misspeculation). This secret
data then flows to z , and finally leaks through the data
cache by the array read b[z ].
Def-Use Graph. To secure the program, we need to cut
the dataflow between the array reads which could intro-
duce transient secret values into the program, and the
index in the array read where they are leaked through the
cache. For this, we first build a def-use graph whose nodes
and directed edges capture the data dependencies between
the expressions and variables of a program. For example,
consider (a subset of) the def-use graph of programEx1 in
Figure 4.1 In the graph, the edge x→x+y indicates that
x is used to compute x+y . To track how transient values
propagate in the def-use graph, we extend the graph with
the special circle node T, which represents the source of
transient values of the program. Since reading memory
creates transient values, we connect the T node to all
nodes containing expressions that explicitly read memory,
e.g.,T→a[i1]. Following the data dependencies along the
edges of the def-use graph, we can see that nodeT is tran-
sitively connected to node z , which indicates that z can
contain transient data at run-time. To detect insecure uses
of transient values, we then extend the graph with the spe-
cial circle node S, which represents the sink of stable (i.e.,
non-transient) values of a program. Intuitively, this node
draws all the values of a program that must be stable to
avoid transient execution attacks. Therefore, we connect
all expression used as array indices in the program to the S
1We omit some irrelevant nodes and edges of the graph for
readability.
x :=a[i1] x :=protect(a[i1])
y :=a[i2] y :=protect(a[i2])
z :=x+y z :=protect(x+y)
w :=b[z ]
Figure 3. Ex1: Running Example. The optimal patch
computed by BLADE is shown in green. A sub-optimal
patch is shown in orange.
T
𝑎[𝑖2]
𝑎[𝑖1] 𝑥
𝑦
𝑥+𝑦 𝑧 S
Figure 4. Subset of the def-use graph of Ex1. The
dashed lines identify two valid choices of cut-sets. The left
cut requires removing two nodes and thus inserting two
protect statements. The right cut shows a minimal
solution, which only requires removing a single node.
node, e.g., z→S. The fact that the graph in Figure 4 con-
tains a path fromT toS indicates that transient data flows
through data dependencies into (what should be) a stable
index expression and thus the program may be leaky.
Cutting the Dataflow. In order to make the program
safe, we need to cut the data-flow between T and S by
introducing protect statements. This problem can be
equivalently restated as follows: find a cut-set, i.e., a set
of variables, such that removing the variables from the
graph eliminates all paths from T from S. Each choice of
cut-set defines a way to repair the program: simply add a
protect statement for each variable in the set. Figure 4
contains two choices of cut-sets, shown as dotted lines.
The cut-set on the left requires two protect statements,
for variables 𝑥 and 𝑦 respectively, corresponding to the
orange patch in Figure 3. The cut-set on the right ismin-
imal, it requires only a single protect, for variable 𝑧, and
corresponds to the green patch in Figure 3. Intuitively,
minimal cut-sets are preferable because they result in
patches that introduce as few protect as needed and
therefore allow more speculation safely. Luckily, the prob-
lem of finding a minimal cut-set is a classic graph problem
called Min-Cut/Max-Flow, for which efficient polynomial-
time algorithms exist [1]. For simplicity, BLADE applies
the basic version of this algorithm and synthetizes patches
that include a minimal number of protect, regardless of
their position in the code and howmany times they can be
executed. We can extend this algorithm to consider also
additional criteria (e.g., proximity to the sink node and the
presence of loops) when searching for a minimal cut set.
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2.3 Proving
Correctness via Transient-Flow Types
Technically, BLADE needs only the def-use graph of a
program to detect vulnerabilities and synthetize patches.
However, it is convenient to use a type system to show that
patched programs are provably secure, i.e., they satisfy
a semantic security condition. Clearly, the type system
simplifies the security analysis because one can reason
about program execution directly rather than through
generic flows of information in the def-use graph. Further-
more, restricting the security analysis only to the type
system makes the security proofs independent from the
specific algorithm used to compute the program repairs
(e.g., the Max-Flow/Min-Cut algorithm). As long as the
repaired program type checks, the formal guarantees of
BLADE remain valid even if we apply different algo-
rithms to compute the patches (e.g., the variations on
the Max-Flow/Min-Cut problem mentioned above). To
show that the patches obtained from cutting the def-use
graph of a given program are correct (i.e., they make
the program well-typed), our transient-flow type system
constructs its def-use graph from the type-constraints
generated during type inference.
Typing Judgement. The type system statically assigns
a transient-flow type to each variable: a variable is typed
as transient (written as T), if it can contain transient
data (i.e., potential secrets) at run-time, and as stable
(written as S), otherwise. Given a typing environment Γ
which assigns a transient flow type to each variable, and
a command 𝑐, the type system defines a judgement Γ⊢𝑐
saying that 𝑐 is free of speculative execution bugs. The
type system enforces that transient expressions may not
be used in positions that may leak their value by affecting
memory reads and writes, e.g., they may not be used
as array indices and in loop conditions. Additionally, it
requires that transient expressions may not be assigned
to stable variables, except through the use of protect.
To show that our type system indeed prevents speculative
execution attacks, we define a semantics for speculative
execution of a while language (Section 3) and prove that
well-typed programs do not leak speculatively more than
sequentially, that is by executing their statements in-order
and without speculation (see Section 5).
Type Inference. Given an input program, we construct
the corresponding def-use graph by collecting the type con-
straints generated during type inference. Type inference is
formalized by a typing-inference judgment Γ,Prot⊢c⇒k ,
which extends the typing judgment from above with (1) a
set of protected variables Prot (the cut-set), and (2) a set
of type-constraints k (the def-use graph). At a high level,
type inference has 3 steps: (i) generate a set of constraints
under an initial typing environment and protected set
that allow any program to type-check, (ii) construct the
def-use graph from the constraints and find a cut-set (the
final protected set), and (iii) compute the final typing
environment which types the variables in the cut-set as
stable. To characterize the security of a still unrepaired
program after type inference, we define a typing judgment
Γ,Prot ⊢ c, where unprotected variables are explicitly
accounted for in the Prot set.2 Intuitively, the program is
secure if we promise to insert a protect statement for
each variable in Prot.
To repair programs, we simply honor this promise and
insert a protect statement for each variable in the pro-
tected set of the typing judgment obtained above. Once
repaired, the program type checks under an empty pro-
tected set and with the final typing environment.
2.4 Attacker Model
Beforemoving to the details of our semantics and transient
type system, we discuss the attacker model considered in
this work. The attacker runs cryptographic code on a spec-
ulative out-of-order processor and, as usual, can choose
the values of public inputs and observe public outputs,
but may not read secret data (e.g., cryptographic keys) in
registers and memory. Additionally, the attacker can influ-
ence how programs are speculatively executed through the
branch predictor and choose the instructions execution
order in the processor pipeline. The effects of these actions
are observable through the cache and are otherwise invisi-
ble at the ISA level. In particular, while programs run, the
attacker can take precise timing measurements through
the data- and instruction-cache with a cache-line granular-
ity, whichmay disclose secret data covertly. These features
allow the attacker to mount Spectre-PHT attacks [22, 23]
and leak data through FLUSH+RELOAD [47] and
PRIME+PROBE [38] cache side-channels attacks. We
do not consider speculative attacks that rely on the Re-
turn Stack Buffer (e.g., Ret2Spec [27] and [24]), Branch
Target Buffer (Spectre-BTB [23]), or the Store To Load
optimization (Spectre-STL [10]). We similarly do not con-
sider attacks that do not use the cache to exfiltrate data,
e.g., port contention (SMoTherSpectre [7]) andMeltdown
attacks [10, 26], since hardware fixes address them.
3 A Semantics for Speculation
We now formalize the concepts presented in the overview.
We start by giving a formal semantics for a while language
with speculative execution. Figure 5 presents the lan-
guage’s surface syntax. Values consist of Booleans b, point-
ers n represented as natural numbers, and arrays a. Array
length and base address are given by functions length(·)
and base(·). In addition to variable assignments, pointer
dereferences, array stores, conditionals and loops, our
language features a special command that helps prevent
2The judgment Γ⊢c is just a short-hand for Γ,∅⊢c.
Conference, 2020 Marco Vassena and Klaus v. Gleissenthall and Rami Gökhan Kici and Deian Stefan and Ranjit Jhala
Value v ::= n | b | a
Expr. e ::= v | x | e1+e2 | e1⩽e2
| length(e) | base(e)
Rhs. r ::= e | *e | e[e]
Cmd. c ::= skip | x :=r | *e=e | e1[e2]:=e3
| if e thenc1 elsec2
|whileedoc | fail | c1;c2
| x :=protect(r)
Figure 5. Surface Syntax.
transient execution attacks. Command x :=protect(r)
evaluates r and assigns its value to x , only after the value
is stable (i.e., non-transient). Lastly, fail triggers a mem-
ory violation error (caused by reading or writing an array
out-of-bounds) and aborts the program.
Processor Instructions. Our semantics translates the
surface syntax into an abstract set of processor instruc-
tions shown in Figure 6. This set does not contain an ex-
plicit branching instruction. Instead, a sequence of guard
instructions represent a series of pending branch points
along a single predicted path. Guard instructions have
form guard(eb ,cs,p), which records the branch condition
e, its predicted truth value b and a unique guard identifier
p, used in our security analysis (Section 5). Each guard
attests to the fact that the current execution is valid only
if the branch condition gets resolved as predicted. In order
to enable a roll-back in case of a missprediction, guards
additionally record the sequence of commands cs along
the alternative branch.
Directives and Observations. Instructions do not
have to be executed in sequence, they can be executed
in any order, enabling out-of-order execution. We use a
simple three stage processor pipeline: the execution of
each instruction is split into fetch, exec, and retire. We
do not fix the order in which instructions, and their in-
dividual stages are executed, nor do we supply a model
of the branch predictor to decide which control flow path
to follow. Instead, we let the attacker supply those deci-
sions through a set of directives [13] shown in Fig. 6. For
example, directive fetchtrue fetches the true branch of
a conditional and execn executes the nth instruction in
the reorder buffer. Executing an instruction generates an
observation (Fig. 6) which records attacker observable
behavior. Observations include speculative memory reads
and writes (i.e., load(n,ps) and store(n,ps) issued while
guards ps are pending), rollbacks (i.e., rollback(p) due to
misspeculation of guard p), and memory violations (fail).
Most instructions generate the empty observation 𝜖.
Configurations and Reduction Relation. We for-
mally specify our semantics as a reduction relation
Instr. i ::= nop | x :=e | x :=load(e)
| store(e1,e2) | x :=protect(e)
| guard(eb ,cs,p) | fail
Dir. d ::= fetch | fetchb | execn
| retire
Obs. o ::= 𝜖 | load(n,ps) | store(n,ps)
| fail | rollback(p)
Prediction b ∈ {true,false}
Guard Id. p ∈ N
Reorder Buffer is ::= i :is | [ ]
Cmd Stack cs ::= c :cs | [ ]
Memory Store 𝜇 ∈ N⇀Value
Variables Map 𝜌 ∈ Var→Value
Configuration C ::= ⟨is,cs,𝜇,𝜌⟩
Figure 6. Processor Syntax.
betweenprocessor configurations.A configuration ⟨is,cs,𝜇,𝜌⟩
consists of a queue of in-flight instructions is called reorder
buffer, a stack of commands cs, a memory 𝜇, and a map
𝜌 from variables to values. A reduction step C d−→o C ′
denotes that, under directive d , configuration C is trans-
formed into C ′ and generates observation o. To execute
a program c with initial memory 𝜇 and variable map 𝜌,
the processor initializes the configuration with an empty
reorder buffer and inserts the program into the command
stack, i.e., ⟨[ ],[c ],𝜇,𝜌⟩. Then, the execution proceeds until
both the reorder buffer and the stack in the configuration
are empty , i.e., we reach a configuration of the form
⟨[ ],[ ],𝜇′,𝜌′⟩, for some final memory store 𝜇′ and variable
map 𝜌′.
We now discuss the semantics rules of each execution
stage and then those for our security primitive.
3.1 Fetch Stage
The fetch stage flattens the input command into a se-
quence of instructions which it stores in the reorder
buffer. Figure 7 presents selected rules; the remaining rules
are in Appendix A. Rule [Fetch-Seq] pops command
c1;c2 from the commands stack and pushes the two sub-
commands for further processing. [Fetch-Asgn] pops
an assignment from the commands stack and appends the
corresponding processor instruction (x :=e) at the end of
the reorder buffer.3 Rule [Fetch-Ptr-Load] is similar
and simply translates pointer dereferences to the corre-
sponding load instruction. Arrays provide a memory-safe
interface to read and write memory: the processor injects
bounds-checks when fetching commands that read and
write arrays. For example, rule [Fetch-Array-Load] ex-
pands command x :=e1[e2] into the corresponding pointer
3 Notation [i1, ..., in ] represents a list of n elements, is1 ++ is2
denotes list concatenation, and |is| computes the length of the list is.
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Fetch-Seq
⟨is,(c1;c2):cs,𝜇,𝜌⟩ fetch−−−→𝜖 ⟨is,c1 :c2 :cs,𝜇,𝜌⟩
Fetch-Asgn
⟨is,x :=e :cs,𝜇,𝜌⟩ fetch−−−→𝜖 ⟨is++[x :=e ],cs,𝜇,𝜌⟩
Fetch-Ptr-Load
⟨is,x :=*e :cs,𝜇,𝜌⟩ fetch−−−→𝜖 ⟨is++[x :=load(e)],cs,𝜇,𝜌⟩
Fetch-Array-Load
c=x :=e1[e2] e=e2< length(e1)
e ′=base(e1)+e2 c′= if e thenx :=*e ′ elsefail
⟨is,c :cs,𝜇,𝜌⟩ fetch−−−→𝜖 ⟨is,c′ :cs,𝜇,𝜌⟩
Fetch-If-True
c= if e thenc1 elsec2
fresh(p) i=guard(etrue,c2 :cs,p)
⟨is,c :cs,𝜇,𝜌⟩ fetchtrue−−−−−−→𝜖 ⟨is++[i ],c1 :cs,𝜇,𝜌⟩
Figure 7. Fetch stage (selected rules).
dereference, but guards the commandwith a bounds-check
condition. First, the rule generates the condition e=e2<
length(e1) and calculates the address of the indexed ele-
ment e ′=base(e1)+e2. Then, it replaces the array read
on the stack with command if e thenx :=*e ′ elsefail to
abort the program and prevent the buffer overrun if the
bounds check fails. Later, we show that speculative out-of-
order execution can simply ignore the bounds check guard
and cause the processor to transiently read memory at an
invalid address. Rule [Fetch-If-True] fetches a condi-
tional branch from the stack and, following the prediction
provided in directive fetchtrue, speculates that the con-
dition e will evaluate to true. Thus, the processor inserts
the corresponding instruction guard(etrue,c2 :cs,p) with
a fresh guard identifier p in the reorder buffer and pushes
the then-branch c1 onto the stack cs. Importantly, the
guard instruction stores the else-branch together with a
copy of the current commands stack (i.e., c2 :cs) as a roll-
back stack to restart the execution in case ofmisprediction.
3.2 Execute Stage
In the execute stage, the processor evaluates the operands
of instructions in the reorder buffer and rolls back the
program state whenever it detects a misprediction.
Transient Variable Map. To evaluate operands in the
presence of out-of-order execution, we need to take into
account how previous, possibly unresolved assignments
Execute
|is1|=n−1
𝜌′=𝜑(is1,𝜌) ⟨is1,i ,is2,cs⟩ (𝜇,𝜌
′,o) ⟨is ′,cs ′⟩
⟨is1++[i ]++is2,cs,𝜇,𝜌⟩ execn−−−−→o ⟨is ′,cs ′,𝜇,𝜌⟩
Exec-Asgn
i=(x :=e) v=JeK𝜌 i ′=(x :=v)
⟨is1,i ,is2,cs⟩ (𝜇,𝜌,𝜖) ⟨is1++[i ′ ]++is2,cs⟩
Exec-Branch-Ok
i=guard(eb ,cs ′,p) JeK𝜌=b
⟨is1,i ,is2,cs⟩ (𝜇,𝜌,𝜖) ⟨is1++[nop]++is2,cs⟩
Exec-Branch-Mispredict
i=guard(eb ,cs ′,p) JeK𝜌 ̸=b
⟨is1,i ,is2,cs⟩ (𝜇,𝜌,rollback(p)) ⟨is1,cs ′⟩
Exec-Load
i=(x :=load(e)) store( , ) ̸∈ is1
n=JeK𝜌 ps=Lis1M i ′=(x :=𝜇(n))
⟨is1,i ,is2,cs⟩ (𝜇,𝜌,read(n,ps)) ⟨is1++[i ′ ]++is2,cs⟩
Figure 8. Execute stage (selected rules).
in the reorder buffer affect the variable map. In partic-
ular, we need to ensure that an instruction cannot exe-
cute if it depends on a preceding assignment whose value
is still unknown. To update variable map 𝜌 with the
pending assignments in reorder buffer is, we define a
function 𝜑(is,𝜌), called the transient variable map. The
functionwalks through the reorder buffer, registers each re-
solved assignment instruction (x :=v) in the variable map
(through function update 𝜌[x ↦→v ]) and marks variables
from pending assignments (i.e., x :=e, x :=load(e), and
x :=protect(r)) as undefined (𝜌[x ↦→⊥]), making their
respective values unavailable to following instructions.
Execute Rule and Auxiliary Relation. Step rules
for the reduction relation are shown in Figure 8. Rule
[Execute] executes the n-th instruction in the reorder
buffer, following the directive execn. For this, the rule
splits the reorder buffer into prefix is1, 𝑛-th instrucion
i and suffix is2. Next, it computes the transient vari-
able map 𝜑 (is1,𝜌) and executes a transition step under
the new map using an auxiliary relation⇝. Notice that
[Execute] does not update the store or the variable map
(the transient map is simply discarded). These changes
are performed later in the retire stage.
The rules for the auxiliary relation are shown in Fig. 8.
The relation transforms a tuple ⟨is1,i ,is2,cs⟩ consisting of
prefix, suffix and current instruction i into a tuple ⟨is ′,cs ′⟩
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specifying the reorder buffer and command stack obtained
by executing i . For example, rule [Exec-Asgn] evaluates
the right-hand side of the assignment x :=e where JeK𝜌 de-
notes the value of e under 𝜌. The premise v=JeK𝜌 ensures
that the expression is defined i.e., it does not evaluate to
⊥. Then, the rule substitutes the computed value into the
assignment (x :=v), and reinserts the instruction back
into its original position in the reorder buffer.
Guards and Rollback. Rules [Exec-Branch-Ok] and
[Exec-Branch-Mispredict] resolve guard instructions.
In rule [Exec-Branch-Ok], the predicted and computed
value of the guard expression match, and the processor
only has to replace the guard with a nop. In contrast,
in rule [Exec-Branch-Mispredict] the predicted and
computed value differ (JeK𝜌 ̸= b). This causes the pro-
cessor to revert the program state and issue a rollback
observation. For the rollback, the processor discards the
instructions past the guard (i.e., is2) and substitutes the
current commands stack cs with the rollback stack cs ′
which causes execution to revert to the alternative branch.
Loads. Rule [Exec-Load] executes a memory load. The
rule computes the address (n=JeK𝜌), retrieves the value
at that address from memory (𝜇(n)) and rewrites the
load into an assignment (x :=𝜇(n)). Inserting the assign-
ment into the reorder buffer allows transiently forward-
ing the loaded value to later instructions. The premise
store( , ) ̸∈ is1 prevents the processor from reading stale
data from memory: if the load aliases with a preceding
(but pending) store, ignoring the store would produce a
stale read. To record that the load is issued speculatively,
the observation read(n,ps) stores list ps containing the
identifiers of the guards still pending in the reorder buffer.
Function LisM simply extracts the identifiers of the guard
instructions in the buffer is.
3.3 Retire Stage
The retire stage removes completed instructions from the
reorder buffer and propagates their changes to variable
map and memory store. While instructions are executed
out-of-order, they are retired in-order to preserve the il-
lusion of sequential execution to the user. For this reason,
the rules for the retire stage in Figure 9 always remove
the first instruction in the reorder buffer. For example,
rule [Retire-Nop] removes nop from the front of the re-
order buffer. Rules [Retire-Asgn] and [Retire-Store]
remove the resolved assignment x := v and instruction
store(n,v) from the reorder buffer and update the vari-
able map (𝜌[x ↦→ v ]) and the memory store (𝜇[n ↦→ v ])
respectively. Rule [Retire-Fail] aborts the program by
emptying reorder buffer and command stack and gener-
ates a fail observation, simulating a processor raising an
exception (e.g., a page fault).
Retire-Nop
⟨nop:is,cs,𝜇,𝜌⟩ retire−−−−→𝜖 ⟨is,cs,𝜇,𝜌⟩
Retire-Asgn
⟨x :=v :is,cs,𝜇,𝜌⟩ retire−−−−→𝜖 ⟨is,cs,𝜇,𝜌[x ↦→v ]⟩
Retire-Store
i=store(n,v)
⟨i :is,cs,𝜇,𝜌⟩ retire−−−−→𝜖 ⟨is,cs,𝜇[n ↦→v ],𝜌⟩
Retire-Fail
⟨fail:is,cs,𝜇,𝜌⟩ retire−−−−→fail ⟨[ ],[ ],𝜇,𝜌⟩
Figure 9. Retire stage.
Example.Wedemonstrate how the attacker can leak a se-
cret from programEx1 (Fig. 3) in our model. First, the at-
tacker instructs the processor to fetch all the instructions,
suppling prediction true for all bounds-check conditions.
Figure 10 shows the resulting buffer and how it evolves
after each attacker directive, which instruct the processor
to speculatively execute the load instructions and the as-
signment (but not the guard instructions). Memory 𝜇 and
variable map 𝜌 are shown on the right. Directive exec2 ex-
ecutes the first load instruction by computing the memory
address 2=Jbase(a)+i1K𝜌 and replacing the instruction
with the assignment x :=𝜇(2) containing the loaded value.
Directive exec4 transiently reads array a past its bound,
at index 2, reading into the memory (𝜇(3)=42) of secret
array 𝑠[0] and generates the corresponding observation.
Finally, the processor forwards the values of x and y
through the transient variable map 𝜌[x ↦→ 𝜇(2),y ↦→ 𝜇(3)]
to compute their sum in the fifth instruction, (z :=42),
which is then used as an index in the last instruction and
leaked to the attacker via observation read(42,[1,2,3]).
3.4 Protect
Next, we turn to the rules that formalize the semantics
of protect(·) as an ideal hardware primitive and then its
software implementation via SLH.
Protect in Hardware. Instruction x :=protect(r) as-
signs the value of 𝑟, only after all previous guard instruc-
tions have been executed, i.e., when the value has be-
come stable and no more rollbacks are possible. Figure 11
formalizes this intuition. Rule [Fetch-Protect-Expr]
fetches protect commands involving simple expressions
(x :=protect(e)) and inserts the corresponding protect
instruction in the reorder buffer. Rule [Fetch-Protect-
Array] piggy-backs on the previous rule by splitting a pro-
tect of an array read (x :=protect(e1[e2])) into a separate
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Reorder Buffer exec 2 exec 4 exec 5 exec 7
1 guard((i1< length(a))true,[fail],1)
2 x :=load(base(a)+i1) x :=𝜇(2)
3 guard((i2< length(a))true,[fail],2)
4 y :=load(base(a)+i2) y :=𝜇(3)
5 z :=x+y z :=42
6 guard((z< length(b))true,[fail ],3)
7 w :=load(base(b)+z ) w :=𝜇(42)
Observations: read(2,[1]) read(3,[1,2]) 𝜖 read(42,[1,2,3])
Memory Layout
𝜇(0)=0 b[0]
𝜇(1)=0 a[0]
𝜇(2)=0 a[1]
𝜇(3)=42 𝑠[0]
··· ···
Variable Map
𝜌(i1)=1
𝜌(i2)=2
···
Figure 10. Leaking execution of running example Ex1.
Fetch-Protect-Array
c=(x :=protect(e1[e2]))
c1=(x :=e1[e2]) c2=(x :=protect(x ))
⟨is,c :cs,𝜇,𝜌⟩ fetch−−−→𝜖 ⟨is,c1 :c2 :cs,𝜇,𝜌⟩
Fetch-Protect-Expr
c=(x :=protect(e)) i=(x :=protect(e))
⟨is,c :cs,𝜇,𝜌⟩ fetch−−−→𝜖 ⟨is++[i ],cs,𝜇,𝜌⟩
Exec-Protect1
i=(x :=protect(e))
v=JeK𝜌 i ′=(x :=protect(v))
⟨is1,i ,is2,cs⟩ (𝜇,𝜌,𝜖) ⟨is1++[i ′ ]++is2,cs⟩
Exec-Protect2
i=(x :=protect(v))
guard( , , ) ̸∈ is1 i ′=(x :=v)
⟨is1,i ,is2,cs⟩ (𝜇,𝜌,𝜖) ⟨is1++[i ′ ]++is2,cs⟩
Figure 11. Semantics of protect(·) as a hardware
primitive (selected rules).
assignment of the array value (x :=e1[e2]) and protect of
the variable (x :=protect(x )). Rules [Exec-Protect1]
and [Exec-Protect2] extend the auxiliary relation⇝.
Rule [Exec-Protect1] evaluates the expression (v =JeK𝜌) and reinserts the instruction in the reorder buffer as if
it were a normal assignment. However, the processor leaves
the value wrapped inside the protect instruction in the
reorder buffer, i.e., x :=protect(v), to prevent forwarding
the value to the later instructions via the the transient
variable map. When no guards are pending in the reorder
buffer (guard( , , ) ̸∈ is1), rule [Exec-Protect2]
transforms the instruction into a normal assignment, so
that the processor can propagate and commit its value.
Example. Consider again Ex1 and the execution shown
in Figure 10. In the repaired program, x+y is wrapped
Fetch-Protect-SLH
c=x :=protect(e1[e2])
e=e2< length(e1) e
′=base(e1)+e2
c1=r :=e c2=r :=r ?1:0 c3=x :=*(e ′&r)
c′=c1;if r thenc2;c3 elsefail
⟨is,c :cs,𝜇,𝜌⟩ fetch−−−→𝜖 ⟨is,c′ :cs,𝜇,𝜌⟩
Figure 12. Software implementation of
protect(e1[e2]).
in a protect statement. As a result, directive exec5 pro-
duces value z :=protect(42), instead of z := 42 which
prevents instruction 7 from executing (as its target ad-
dress is undefined), until all guards are resolved. This in
turn prevents the leaking of the transient value.
Protect in software. SLH rewrites array reads by inject-
ing artificial data-dependencies between bound checks
conditions and the corresponding addresses in load in-
structions, thus transforming control-flow dependencies
into data-flow dependencies. These data-dependencies
validate control-flow decisions at runtime by stalling spec-
ulative loads until the processor resolves their bounds
check conditions. Formally, we replace rule [Fetch-
Protect-Array] with rule [Fetch-Protect-SLH] in
Figure 12. The rule computes the bounds check condition
e=e2< length(e1), the target address e ′=(base e1)+e2,
and generate commands that abort the execution if the
check fails, like for regular array reads. Additionally, the
rule generates regular commands that (i) assign the result
of the bounds check to a reserved variable r (c1=r :=e),
(ii) conditionally update the variable with a bitmask con-
sisting of all 1s or 0s (c2=r :=r ?1:0), and (iii) mask off the
target address with the bitmask (c3=x :=*(e ′&r)). Since
the target address in command c3 depends on register r ,
the processor cannot read memory until the bounds check
is resolved. If the check succeeds, the bitmask r=1 leaves
the target address unchanged (Je ′K𝜌=Je ′&1K𝜌) and the
processor reads the correct address normally. Otherwise,
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the bitmask r =0 zeros out the target address and the
processor loads speculatively only from the constant ad-
dress 0=Je ′&0K𝜌. (We assume that the processor reserves
the first memory cell and initializes it with a dummy
value, e.g., 𝜇(0)=0). Notice that this solution works un-
der the assumption that the processor does not evaluate
the conditional update r :=r ?1:0 speculatively. We can
easily enforce that by compiling conditional updates to
non-speculative instructions available on commodity pro-
cessors (e.g., the conditional move instruction CMOV on
x86) [].
Example. Consider again Ex1. The optimal patch
protect(x+y) cannot be executed on existing processors
without support for a generic protect(·) primitive. Nev-
ertheless, we can repair the program by applying SLH to
the individual array reads, i.e., x :=protect(a[i1]) and
y :=protect(a[i2]).
4 Type System and Inference
In Section 4.1, we present a transient-flow type system
which statically rejects programs that can potentially
leak through transient execution attacks. Given an unan-
notated program, we apply constraint-based type infer-
ence [3, 30] to generate its use-def graph and reconstruct
type information (Section 4.2). Then, reusing off-the-shelf
Max-Flow/Min-Cut algorithms, we analyze the graph
and locate potential speculative vulnerabilities in the
form of a variable min-cut set. Finally, using a simple
program repair algorithm we patch the program by in-
serting a minimum number of protect so that it cannot
leak speculatively anymore (Figure 14).
4.1 Type System
Our type system assigns a transient-flow type to expres-
sions and tracks how transient values propagate within
programs, rejecting programs in which transient values
reach commands which may leak them. An expression
can either be typed as stable (S) indicating that it cannot
contain transient values during execution, or as transient
(T) indicating that it can. These types form a 2-point
lattice [25], which allows stable expressions to be typed as
transient, but not vice versa, i.e., we define a can-flow-to
relation ⊑ such that S⊑T, but T ̸⊑ S.
Typing Expressions. Given a typing environment for
variables Γ ∈Var→{S,T}, the typing judgement Γ⊢r :𝜏
assigns a transient-flow type 𝜏 to r . Figure 13 presents
selected rules (see Appendix C for the rest). The shaded
part of the rules generates type constraints during type
inference and are explained later. Values can assume any
type. Variables are assigned their respective type from
the environment. Rule [Bop] propagates the type of the
operands to the result of binary operators ⊕ ∈ {+,<}.
Finally, rule [Array-Read] assigns the transient type
Value
Γ⊢v :𝜏 ⇒∅
Var
Γ(x )=𝜏
Γ⊢x :𝜏 ⇒ 𝑥⊑𝛼𝑥
Bop
Γ⊢e1 :𝜏1 ⇒ k1
Γ⊢e2 :𝜏2 ⇒ k2 𝜏1 ⊑ 𝜏 𝜏2 ⊑ 𝜏
Γ⊢e1⊕ e2 :𝜏 ⇒𝑘1∪𝑘2∪(𝑒1⊑𝑒1⊕𝑒2)∪(𝑒2⊑𝑒1⊕𝑒2)
Array-Read
Γ⊢e1 :S ⇒𝑘1 Γ⊢e2 :S ⇒𝑘2
Γ⊢e1[e2]:T ⇒𝑘1∪𝑘2∪(𝑒1⊑S)∪(𝑒2⊑S)∪(T⊑𝑒1[𝑒2])
(a) Typing Rules for Expressions and Arrays.
Asgn
Γ⊢r :𝜏 ⇒𝑘 𝜏 ⊑ Γ(x )
Γ,Prot⊢x :=r ⇒𝑘∪(𝑟⊑𝑥)
Protect
Γ⊢r :𝜏 ⇒𝑘
Γ,Prot⊢x :=protect(r) ⇒𝑘
Asgn-Prot
Γ⊢r :𝜏 ⇒𝑘 x ∈ Prot
Γ,Prot⊢x :=r ⇒𝑘∪(𝑟⊑𝑥)
If-Then-Else
Γ⊢e :S ⇒𝑘
Γ,Prot⊢c1 ⇒𝑘1 Γ,Prot⊢c2 ⇒𝑘2
Γ,Prot⊢ if e thenc1 elsec2 ⇒𝑘∪𝑘1∪𝑘2∪(𝑒⊑S)
(b) Typing Rules fo Commands.
Figure 13. Transient flow type system and
type constraints generation (selected rules).
to array reads as the array may potentially be indexed
out of bounds during speculation. Importantly, the rule
requires the array index to be stable to prevent programs
from leaking through the cache.
Typing Commands. Given a set of protected variables
Prot, we define a typing judgment Γ,Prot ⊢ c for com-
mands. Intuitively, a command c is well-typed under
environment Γ and set Prot, if c does not leak, under the
assumption that the expressions assigned to all variables
in Prot are protected using the protect(·) primitive. Fig-
ure 13b shows our typing rules. Rule [Asgn] disallows
assignments from transient to stable variables (as T ̸⊑ S).
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Rule [Protect] relaxes this policy as long as the right-
hand side is explicitly protected.4 Intuitively, the result
of protect(·) is stable and it can thus flow securely to
variables of any type. Rule [Asgn-Prot] is similar, but
instead of requiring an explicit protect(·) statement, it
demands that the variable is accounted for in the pro-
tected set Prot. This is secure because all assignments to
variables in Prot will eventually be protected through the
repair function discussed later in this section.
Implicit Flows. To prevent programs from leaking data
implicitly through their control flow, rule [If-Then-Else]
requires the branch condition to be stable. This might
seem overly restrictive, at first: why can’t we accept a pro-
gram that branches on transient data, as long as it does not
perform any attacker-observable operations (e.g., mem-
ory reads and writes) along the branches? Indeed, classic
information-flow control (IFC) type systems (e.g., [40])
take this approach by keeping track of an explicit program
counter label. Unfortunately, such permissiveness is un-
sound under speculation. Even if a branch does not contain
observable behavior, the value of the branch condition can
be leaked by the instructions that follow a mispredicted
branch. In particular, the rollback caused by a mispre-
diction may cause to repeat load and store instructions
after the mispredicted branch, thus revealing whether the
attacker guessed the value of the branch condition.
Example.Consider the following program: if tr then{x :=
0} else {skip}; y := a[0]. The program can leak the
value of tr during speculative execution. To see that,
assume that the processor predicts that tr will evaluate
to true. Then, the processor speculatively executes the
then-branch (x:=0) and the load instruction (y :=a[0]),
before resolving the condition. If tr is true, the memory
trace of the program contains a single read observation.
However, if tr is false, the processor detects a mispredic-
tion, restarts the execution from the other branch (skip)
and executes the array read, producing a rollback and two
read observations. From these observations, an attacker
could potentially make inferences about the value of tr .
Consequently, if tr is typed as T, our type system rejects
the program as unsafe.
4.2 Type Inference
We now present our type inference algorithm.
Constraints.We start by collecting a set of constraints 𝑘
via typing judgement Γ,Prot⊢𝑠 ⇒𝑘. For this, we define
a dummy environment Γ* and protected set Prot*, such
that Γ*,Prot*⊢𝑐 ⇒𝑘 holds for any command 𝑐, (i.e., we
let Γ*=𝜆x .S and include all variables in the cut-set) and
use it to extract the set of constraints 𝑘. The syntax for
4Readers familiar with information-flow control may see an analogy
between protect and the declassify primitive of some IFC
languages [29].
constraints is shown in Figure 22. The constraints relate
atoms which represent the unknown type of variables,
i.e., 𝛼𝑥 for 𝑥, and expression, i.e., 𝑟. Constraints record
can-flow-to relationships between the atoms and lattice
values T and S. They are accumulated via operator ∪,
where we identify 𝑘1∪···∪𝑘𝑛 with the set {𝑘1,...,𝑘𝑛}.
Solutions and Satisfiability.We define the solution to
a set of constraints as a function𝜎 fromatoms to flow types,
i.e., 𝜎∈Atoms ↦→{T,S}, and extend solutions to map T
and S to themselves. For a set of constraints 𝑘 and a solu-
tion function 𝜎, we write 𝜎⊢𝑘 to say that the constraints 𝑘
are satisfied under solution 𝜎. A solution 𝜎 satisfies 𝑘, if all
can-flow-to constraints hold, when the atoms are replaced
by their values under 𝜎. We say that a set of constraints 𝑘
is satisfiable, if there is a solution 𝜎 such that 𝜎⊢𝑘.
Def-Use Graph & Paths. The constraints generated
by our type system give rise to the def-use graph of the
type-checked program. For a set of constraints 𝑘, we call
a sequence of atoms 𝑎1 ...𝑎𝑛 a path in 𝑘, if 𝑎𝑖⊑ 𝑎𝑖+1 ∈ 𝑘
for 𝑖∈{1,...,𝑛−1} and say that 𝑎1 is the path’s entry and
𝑎𝑛 its exit. A T-S path is a path with entry T and exit
S. A set of constraints 𝑘 is satisfiable if and only if there
is no T-S path in 𝑘, as such a path would correspond to
a derivation of false. If 𝑘 is satisfiable, we can compute
a solution 𝜎(𝑘) by letting 𝜎(𝑘)(𝑎)=T, if there is a path
with entry T and exit 𝑎, and S otherwise.
Cuts. If a set of constraints is unsatisfiable, we can make
it satisfiable by removing some of the nodes in its graph
or equivalently protecting some of the variables. A set of
atoms 𝐴 cuts a path 𝑎1...𝑎𝑛, if some 𝑎∈𝐴 occurs along
the path, i.e., there exists 𝑎∈𝐴 and 𝑖∈{1,...,𝑛} such that
𝑎𝑖=𝑎. We call 𝐴 a cut-set for a set of constraints 𝑘, if 𝐴
cuts all T-S paths in 𝑘. A cut-set 𝐴 is minimal for 𝑘, if
all other cut-sets 𝐴′ contain as many or more atoms than
𝐴, i.e., #𝐴⩽#𝐴′.
Extracting Types FromCuts.Froma set of variables𝐴
such that 𝐴 is a cut-set of constraints 𝑘, we can extract a
typing environment Γ(𝑘,𝐴) as follows: for an atom 𝛼𝑥, we
define Γ(𝑘,𝐴)(𝑥)=T, if there is a path with entry T and
exit 𝛼𝑥 in 𝑘 that is not cut by 𝐴, and let Γ(𝑘,𝐴)(𝑥)=S
otherwise.
Proposition 1 (Type Inference). If Γ*,Prot* ⊢ 𝑐 ⇒ 𝑘
and 𝐴 is a set of variables that cut 𝑘, then Γ(𝑘,𝐴),𝐴⊢𝑠.
Remark. To infer a repair using exclusively SLH-based
protect statements, we simply restrict our cut-set to only
include variables that are assigned from an array read.
Example. Consider again Ex1 in Figure 3. The graph
defined by the constraints 𝑘, given by Γ*,Prot*⊢Ex1 ⇒𝑘
is shown in Figure 4, where we have omitted 𝛼-nodes. The
constraints are not satisfiable, since there are T-S paths.
Both {𝑥,𝑦} and {𝑧} are cut-sets, since they cut each T-S
path, however, the set {𝑧} contains only one element and
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Atom 𝑎 ::= 𝛼𝑥 |𝑟
Constraint 𝑘 ::= 𝑎⊑S | T⊑𝑎 | 𝑎⊑𝑎 | 𝑘∪𝑘 | ∅
Solution 𝜎 ∈ Atoms ↦→{S,T}
Figure 14. Constraint Syntax.
is therefore minimal. The typing environment Γ(𝑘,{𝑥,𝑦})
extracted from the sub-obptimal cut {𝑥,𝑦} types all vari-
ables as S, while the typing extracted from the optimal
cut, i.e., Γ(𝑘,{𝑧}) types 𝑥 and 𝑦 as T and 𝑧, 𝑖1 and 𝑖2 as
S. By Proposition 2 both Γ(𝑘,{𝑥,𝑦}),{𝑥,𝑦} ⊢ Ex1 and
Γ(𝑘,{𝑧}),{𝑧}⊢Ex1 hold.
4.3 Program Repair
As a final step, our repair algorithm 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟(c,Prot) tra-
verses program c and inserts a protect(·) statement for
each variable in the cut-set Prot. Since we assume that
programs are in static single assignment form, there is a
single assignment x :=r for each variable x ∈ Prot, and our
repair algorithm simply replaces it with x :=protect(r).
5 Consistency and Security
We now present two formal results about our speculative
semantics and the security of the type system. First, we
prove that the semantics from Section 3 is consistent with
sequential program execution (Theorem 5.1). Intuitively,
programs running on our processor produce the same
results (with respect to the memory store and variables)
as if their commands were executed in-order and without
speculation. The second result establishes that our type
system is sound (Theorem 5.2). We prove that the type
system enforces a security property similar to specula-
tive non-interference [18]: well-typed programs do not
leak speculatively more than they leak sequentially. Full
definitions and proofs can be found in Appendix D.
Consistency.We write C ⇓DO C ′ for the complete specu-
lative execution of configuration C to final configuration
C ′, which generates a trace of observations O under list
of directives D . Similarly, we write ⟨𝜇,𝜌⟩ ⇓cO ⟨𝜇′,𝜌′⟩ for
the sequential execution of program c with initial mem-
ory 𝜇 and variable map 𝜌 resulting in final memory 𝜇′
and variable map 𝜌′. To relate speculative and sequen-
tial observations, we define a projection function, written
O↓, which removes prediction identifiers, rollbacks, and
mispeculated loads and stores.
Theorem 5.1 (Consistency). For all programs c, initial
memory stores 𝜇, variable maps 𝜌, and directives D , such
that ⟨𝜇,𝜌⟩ ⇓cO ⟨𝜇′,𝜌′⟩ and ⟨[ ], [c ],𝜇,𝜌⟩ ⇓DO′ ⟨[ ], [ ],𝜇′′,𝜌′′⟩,
then 𝜇′=𝜇′′, 𝜌′=𝜌′′, and O∼=O ′↓.
The theorem ensures equivalence of the final memory
stores, variable maps, and observation traces from the se-
quential and the speculative execution. Notice that trace
equivalence is up to permutation, i.e., O∼=O ′↓, because
the processor can execute load and store instructions
out-of-order.
Speculative Non-Interference.Speculative non-interference
is parametric in the security policy that specifies which
variables and part of the memory are controlled by the at-
tacker [18]. In the following, we write L for the set of public
variables and memory locations that are observable by the
attacker. Two variable maps are indistinguishable to the
attacker, written 𝜌1≈L 𝜌2, if and only if 𝜌1(x )=𝜌2(x ) for
all x ∈ L. Similarly, memory stores are related pointwise,
i.e., 𝜇1≈L𝜇2 iff 𝜇1(n)=𝜇2(n) for all n ∈ L.
Definition 1 (Speculative Non-Interference). A program
c satisfies speculative non-interference, written SNI L(c),
if and only if for all directives D , memory stores and
variable maps such that 𝜇1 ≈L 𝜇2 and 𝜌1 ≈L 𝜌2, let
Ci=⟨[ ],[c ],𝜇i ,𝜌i⟩ for i ∈ {1,2}, if C1 ⇓DO1 C ′1, C2 ⇓DO2 C ′2,
and O1↓=O2↓, then O1=O2.
In the defintion above, programs leak by producing
different observations and starting from memories and
variables indistinguishable to the attacker. Speculative
non-interference requires showing absence of leaks for the
speculative traces (O1=O2) assuming that the program
does not already leak sequentially (O1↓= O2↓). Notice
that here we consider syntactic equivalence for the traces
because both executions follow the same list of direc-
tives. We now present our soundness theorem: well-typed
programs satisfy speculative non-interference.
Theorem 5.2 (Soundness). For all programs c and se-
curity policies L, if Γ⊢c, then SNI L(c).
Notice that our type system does not use the security
policy L, yet it can enforce speculative non-interference
for any security policy. Intuitively, this theorem holds
because the type system conservatively prohibits all data
flows from transient source to stable sinks, regardless of
the sensitivity (public or secret) of the source.
We conclude with a corollary that combines all the
components of our protection chain (type inference, type
checking and automatic repair) and shows that repaired
programs satisfy speculative non-interference.
Corollary 5.3. For all programs c, there exists a set of
constraints k such that Γ*,Prot* ⊢ c⇒ k . Let A be a set
of variables that cut k , then SNI L(𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟(c,A)) for all
security policies L.
6 Implementation and Evaluation
Wenowdescribe our implementation and evaluateBLADE
on an implementation of the Signal secure messaging pro-
tocol and various cryptographic algorithms. Our evalu-
ation shows that BLADE can secure existing software
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systems against speculative execution attacks automat-
ically. Moreover, BLADE introduces two orders of mag-
nitude less fences than a baseline algorithm implemented
in Clang. As a result, the repairs computed by BLADE
incur only a minimal performance overhead.
6.1 Implementation
We implemented BLADE in 3500 lines of Haskell code.
BLADE takes as input a WebAssembly program, com-
putes a repaired program that is safe under speculative exe-
cution and verifies its correctness via type-checking. Inter-
nally, BLADE proceeds in three stages. First, BLADE
converts the WebAssembly program into an intermediate
representation similar to the While language in Figure 5.
This simplifies further processing as WebAssembly is a
stack-based language, i.e., arguments are not represented
directly, but instead kept on an argument stack. Second,
BLADE builds the use-def graph (§4.1) of the input
program, infers a minimal cut-set (§4.2), and computes
the repair (§4.3). Finally, in the last stage, BLADE ex-
tracts a typing-environment from the use-def graph and
type-checks the repaired program (§4). This independent
checking step provides extra confidence that the repaired
program indeed does not leak more speculatively, than it
does sequentially (§5). Source code will be made available
under an open source license.
6.2 Evaluation
We evaluateBLADE by answering three questions: (Q1)
Can we apply BLADE to secure existing software? (Q2)
How many protect statements does BLADE have to
insert in order to secure those systems? and (Q3) How
do the inserted protect statements affect the runtime
performance?
(Q1) Applicability. To evaluate BLADE’s applicabil-
ity, we run it on crypto code, which is already carefully
written to eschew cache-timing side channels. Our bench-
marks are taken from two main sources: first, a verified
implementation [32] of the Signal messaging protocol [16],
and second, verified implementations of several crypto
primitives taken from [42]. In particular, our benchmarks
consist of
◁ The messaging algorithm implemented in module Signal
Core and common cryptographic constructions imple-
mented in module Signal Crypto and used in Signal.
◁ The HACL* SHA2 hash, AES block cypher, Curve25519
elyptic curve function, and ED25519 digital signature
used in Signal.
◁ The SALSA20 stream cypher, SHA2 hash, and TEA block
cypher from [42].
The original implementations of our benchmarks are prov-
ably free from cache and timing side-channel. However,
those proofs considered only a sequential execution model
and therefore do not account for the speculative execution
vulnerabilities addressed in this work.
Results. Table 1 shows the code size in Webssembly
text format, and the runtime of BLADE on each bench-
mark. The runtime includes translation, repair and type-
checking. The results are encouraging: the execution time
scales proportionally with the code size and the analysis
completes fairly quickly, even for large benchmarks (>60k
WASM LOC): the runtime is less than 10s for all of our
benchmarks.
(Q2) Number of protect. Next, we evaluate how
many protect statements the analysis has to insert
to make the programs secure. The results are shown in
Table 1. Column B contains our baseline, which replaces
all non-constant array reads, i.e., reads whose address
depends on a variable, with statement stable_read
(Section 3.4), implementing a SLH-like mitigation that
masks the address with the array bounds-check condition.
This is the proposed mitigation in the Clang compiler [11].
Column P shows the number of protect inserted by
BLADE. All benchmarks are modified by the baseline,
except for TEA, which is a simple, toy encryption algo-
rithm (that should not be used in practice). In particular,
for five of the nine programs, BLADE does not need to
insert any fences. Column P/B shows the ratio of protect
statements to baseline read masks in percent. For most
benchmarks, our analysis has to insert under 3% of fences
compared to the baseline. For the SHA2 implementation
of HACL* this rises to 11.5%. Across all benchmarks, the
number of fences is two orders of magnitude lower than
the baseline. Since protect statements are an idealized
primitive that are not available in todays hardware, we
show the number of stable-read primitives that are
needed to implement the protect in column S. The ta-
ble shows that using stable reads requires inserting more
fences by a factor of 1.8x, which underlines the benefits
of a hardware implementation of protect.
(Q3) Runtime performance overhead. To evaluate
the runtime performance impact of our repair, we com-
pared how a naive placement of fences—applying spec-
ulative load hardening to every load of a non-constant
address—compares against our approach. We picked the
SHA2-512 hash function for this test, and used inputs
of size 4KB. Naive fence placement introduced 44 fences
while ours introduced only 5. Our measurements showed
that while the naive repair algorithm caused 13.9% over-
head, the overhead of our minimal fence replacement algo-
rithm was only 0.42%. We used a sample size of 500, and
found the relative margin of error of our measurements
were less than 0.07%.
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Name B P S P/B LOC Time
CRYPTO [32] 92 1 2 1.1 3386 181.0 ms
CORE [32] 47 1 2 2.1 6595 347.8 ms
SHA2 [32] 156 18 34 11.5 7310 286.7 ms
AES[32] 48 0 0 0 6284 28.95 ms
CURVE [32] 2214 0 0 0 59921 5.571 s
ED25519 [32] 2403 6 10 0.2 60308 8.797 s
SALSA 20 [42] 7 0 0 0 529 20.20 ms
SHA 256 [42] 23 0 0 0 334 11.23 ms
TEA [42] 0 0 0 - 112 3.036 ms
Total 4990 26 48 0.5 144779 -
Table 1. (B) contains our baseline, i.e., the number of
stable_read, if every non-constant read is protected;
(P) contains the number of protect statements insert by
BLADE; (S) contains the number of stable_read in-
serted, if stable_read is used to implement protect;
(P/B) contains the ratio of protect statments to the
baseline fences in %; (LOC) contains the number of lines
of WASM code in text format; (Time) shows the mean
timing for fence inference, repair, and typechecking over
15 trials; Experiments were run on a 12” Macbook with
8GB RAM.
7 Related Work
Transient Execution Attacks. Since Spectre [23] and
Meltdown [26] were announced, many transient execution
attacks exploiting different microarchitectural compo-
nents and side-channels have been discovered and new
ones come to light at a steady pace. These attacks leak
data across arbitrary security boundaries, including SGX
enclaves [15, 39], hypervisors and virtual machines [44],
and even remotely over a network [34]. We refer to [10]
for a comprehensive systematization.
Detection and Repair.Wu andWang [45] detect cache
side channels via abstract interpretation by augmenting
the control-flow to accomodate for speculation. Spectec-
tor [? ] and Pitchfork [13] use symbolic execution on x86
binaries to detect speculative vulnerabilities. Cheang et al.
[14] and Bloem et al. [8] apply bounded model checking to
detect potential speculative vulnerabilities respectively
via 4-ways self-composition and taint-tracking. Almost all
these efforts [8, 13, 14, 45? ] consider only in-order execu-
tion (except Pitchfork [13]) for a fixed speculation bound,
and focus on vulnerability detection but do not propose
techniques to repair vulnerable programs. In contrast, our
type system enforces speculative non-interference even
when program instructions are executed out-of-order with
unbounded speculation and automatically synthesizes re-
pairs. Given a set of untrusted input source, oo7 Wang
et al. [41] statically analyzes a binary to detect vulnerable
patterns and inserts fences in turn. Our tool, BLADE,
not only repairs vulnerable programs without user an-
notation, but ensures that program patches contain a
minimum number of fences. Furthermore, BLADE for-
mally guarantees that repaired programs are free from
speculation-based attacks.
Speculative Execution Semantics. There have been
several recent proposals for speculative execution seman-
tics [13, 14, 28? ]. Of those, [13] is closest to ours, and
inspired our semantics (e.g., we share the 3-stages pipeline,
attacker-supplied directives and the instruction reorder
buffer). However their semantics targets an assembly
language with direct jumps, while we reason about spec-
ulative execution of imperative programs with structured
control-flow.
Hardware Mitigations and Secure Design. Both
AMD AMD [5] and Intel Intel [21] recommend insert-
ing serializing, fence instructions after bounds checks to
protect against Spectre v1 attacks and some compilers
followed suit [20, 31]. Unfortunately, these defenses causes
significant performance degradation [10]. Taram et al. [36]
propose context-sensitive fencing, a hardware-based mit-
igation that dynamically inserts fences in the instruction
stream when dangerous conditions arise. Several secure
hardware designs have been studied to remove speculative
attacks from future processors. InvisiSpec Yan et al. [46]
is a new micro-architecture design that features a special
speculative buffer to prevent speculative loads from pollut-
ing the cache. STT [2] tracks speculative taints inside the
processor micro-architecture and prevent speculative val-
ues from reaching instructions that could serve as covert
channels.We think our approach could be applied to guide
such hardware mitigations by pinpointing the program
parts that need to be protected.
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A Full Calculus
Fetch-Skip
⟨is,skip:cs,𝜇,𝜌⟩ fetch−−−→𝜖 ⟨is++[nop],cs,𝜇,𝜌⟩
Fetch-Asgn
⟨is,x :=e :cs,𝜇,𝜌⟩ fetch−−−→𝜖 ⟨is++[x :=e ],cs,𝜇,𝜌⟩
Fetch-Seq
⟨is,c1;c2 :cs,𝜇,𝜌⟩ fetch−−−→𝜖 ⟨is,c1 :c2 :cs,𝜇,𝜌⟩
Fetch-Ptr-Load
⟨is,x :=*e :cs,𝜇,𝜌⟩ fetch−−−→𝜖 ⟨is++[x :=load(e)],cs,𝜇,𝜌⟩
Fetch-Ptr-Store
⟨is,*e1 :=e2 :cs,𝜇,𝜌⟩ fetch−−−→𝜖 ⟨is++[store(e1,e2)],cs,𝜇,𝜌⟩
Fetch-Fail
⟨is,fail:cs,𝜇,𝜌⟩ fetch−−−→𝜖 ⟨is++[fail ],cs,𝜇,𝜌⟩
Fetch-Array-Load
c=x :=e1[e2] e=e2< length(e1) fresh(p)
e ′=base(e1)+e2 c′= if e thenx :=*e ′ elsefail
⟨is,c :cs,𝜇,𝜌⟩ fetch−−−→𝜖 ⟨is,c′ :cs,𝜇,𝜌⟩
Fetch-Array-Store
c=e1[e2]:=e3 e=e2< length(e1) fresh(p)
e ′=base(e1)+e2 c′= if e then *e ′ :=e elsefail
⟨is,c :cs,𝜇,𝜌⟩ fetch−−−→𝜖 ⟨is,c′ :cs,𝜇,𝜌⟩
Fetch-If-True
c= if e thenc1 elsec2
fresh(p) i=guard(etrue,c2 :cs,p)
⟨is,c :cs,𝜇,𝜌⟩ fetchtrue−−−−−−→𝜖 ⟨is++[i ],c1 :cs,𝜇,𝜌⟩
Fetch-If-False
c= if e thenc1 elsec2
fresh(p) i=guard(efalse,c1 :cs,p)
⟨is,c :cs,𝜇,𝜌⟩ fetchfalse−−−−−−−→𝜖 ⟨is++[i ],c2 :cs,𝜇,𝜌⟩
Fetch-While
c1=c;whilee c c2= if e thenc1 elseskip
⟨is,whilee c :cs,𝜇,𝜌⟩ fetch−−−→𝜖 ⟨is,c2 :cs,𝜇,𝜌⟩
Figure 15. Fetch stage.
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Execute
|is1|=n−1
𝜌′=𝜑(is1,𝜌) ⟨is1,i ,is2,cs⟩ (𝜇,𝜌
′,o) ⟨is ′,cs ′⟩
⟨is1++[i ]++is2,cs,𝜇,𝜌⟩ execn−−−−→o ⟨is ′,cs ′,𝜇,𝜌⟩
Exec-Asgn
i=(x :=e) v=JeK𝜌 i ′=(x :=v)
⟨is1,i ,is2,cs⟩ (𝜇,𝜌,𝜖) ⟨is1++[i ′ ]++is2,cs⟩
Exec-Branch-Ok
i=guard(eb ,cs ′,p) JeK𝜌=b
⟨is1,i ,is2,cs⟩ (𝜇,𝜌,𝜖) ⟨is1++[nop]++is2,cs⟩
Exec-Branch-Mispredict
i=guard(eb ,cs ′,p) JeK𝜌 ̸=b
⟨is1,i ,is2,cs⟩ (𝜇,𝜌,rollback(p)) ⟨is1,cs ′⟩
Exec-Load
i=x :=load(e) store( , ) ̸∈ is1
n=JeK𝜌 ps=Lis1M i ′=(x :=𝜇(n))
⟨is1,i ,is2,cs⟩ (𝜇,𝜌,read(n,ps)) ⟨is1++[i ′ ]++is2,cs⟩
Exec-Store-Addr
i=store(e1,e2) n=Je1K𝜌 i ′=store(n,e2)
⟨is1,i ,is2,cs⟩ (𝜇,𝜌,𝜖) ⟨is1++[i ′ ]++is2,cs⟩
Exec-Store-Value
i=store(n,e)
v=JeK𝜌 ps=Lis1M i ′=store(n,v)
⟨is1,i ,is2,cs⟩ (𝜇,𝜌,write(n,ps)) ⟨is1++[i ′ ]++is2,cs⟩
Figure 16. Execute stage.
Retire-Nop
⟨nop:is,cs,𝜇,𝜌⟩ retire−−−−→𝜖 ⟨is,cs,𝜇,𝜌⟩
Retire-Asgn
⟨x :=v :is,cs,𝜇,𝜌⟩ retire−−−−→𝜖 ⟨is,cs,𝜇,𝜌[x ↦→v ]⟩
Retire-Store
i=store(n,v)
⟨i :is,cs,𝜇,𝜌⟩ retire−−−−→𝜖 ⟨is,cs,𝜇[n ↦→v ],𝜌⟩
Retire-Fail
⟨fail:is,cs,𝜇,𝜌⟩ retire−−−−→fail ⟨[ ],[ ],𝜇,𝜌⟩
Figure 17. Retire stage.
𝜑(𝜌,[ ])=𝜌
𝜑(𝜌,(x :=v):is)=𝜑(𝜌[x ↦→v ],is)
𝜑(𝜌,(x :=e):is)=𝜑(𝜌[x ↦→⊥],is)
𝜑(𝜌,(x :=load(e)):is)=𝜑(𝜌[x ↦→⊥],is)
𝜑(𝜌,(x :=protect(e)):is)=𝜑(𝜌[x ↦→⊥],is)
𝜑(𝜌,i :is)=𝜑(𝜌,is)
(a) Transient Variable Map.
JvK𝜌=vJxK𝜌=𝜌(x )Jlength(e)K𝜌= length(JeK𝜌)Jbase(e)K𝜌=base(JeK𝜌)Je1+e2K𝜌=Je1K𝜌+Je2K𝜌Je1⩽e2K𝜌=Je1K𝜌⩽Je2K𝜌
(b) Evaluation Function.
L[ ]M=[ ]Lguard(eb ,cs,p):isM=p :LisMLi :isM=LisM
(c) Pending Guard Identifiers.
Figure 18. Helper functions.
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Fetch-Protect-Ptr
c=x :=protect(*e)
c1=x :=*e c2=x :=protect(x )
⟨is,c :cs,𝜇,𝜌⟩ fetch−−−→𝜖 ⟨is,c1 :c2 :cs,𝜇,𝜌⟩
Fetch-Protect-Array
c=x :=protect(e1[e2])
c1=x :=e1[e2] c2=x :=protect(x )
⟨is,c :cs,𝜇,𝜌⟩ fetch−−−→𝜖 ⟨is,c1 :c2 :cs,𝜇,𝜌⟩
Fetch-Protect-Expr
c=x :=protect(e) i=x :=protect(e)
⟨is,c :cs,𝜇,𝜌⟩ fetch−−−→𝜖 ⟨is++[i ],cs,𝜇,𝜌⟩
Exec-Protect1
i=x :=protect(e)
v=JeK𝜌 i ′=x :=protect(v)
⟨is1,i ,is2,cs⟩ (𝜇,𝜌,𝜖) ⟨is1++[i ′ ]++is2,cs⟩
Exec-Protect2
i=x :=protect(v)
guard( , , ) ̸∈ is1 i ′=(x :=v)
⟨is1,i ,is2,cs⟩ (𝜇,𝜌,𝜖) ⟨is1++[i ′ ]++is2,cs⟩
Figure 19. Semantics of protect(·).
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B Semantics of Stable Read
Current processors do not provide a protect primitive
instruction nor the means to implement it on top of exist-
ing instructions, in its full generality. However, for array
reads, it is possible to replicate the effects of protect by ex-
ploiting the same data-dependencies tracking capabilities
at the core of the processor pipeline. Indeed, Speculative
Load Hardening (SLH), a mitigation technique deployed
in the code generated by the CLANG compiler, relies on
data-dependencies to secure memory loads automatically
[11]. Using our formalmodel, we give rigorous semantics to
SLH and show that it can stop transient execution attacks.
At a high level, SLH injects artificial data-dependencies
between the conditions used in branch instructions and the
addresses loaded in the following instructions to transform
control-flow dependencies into data-flow dependencies.
Intuitively, these data-dependencies validate control-flow
decisions at runtime by stalling speculative loads until
the processor resolves the conditions. Using branch con-
ditions, SLH masks the address of loads instructions in
such a way that the processor zeroes out the address if
the condition is mispredicted, preventing misloads.
To formalize this mechanism, we extend our processor
model as follows. We introduce a new processor instruc-
tion x :=e ?e1 :e2, which corresponds to the conditional
move instruction CMOV on x86 processors. This instruc-
tion simply assigns the value of e1 (resp. e2) to variable
x , if the condition e evaluates to true (resp. false). Impor-
tantly, this instruction is not subject to speculation: the
processor must first evaluate the condition before it can
resolve the assignment. We also extend expressions with
the standard bitwise AND operator (&) and write 0 and
1 for bit words consisting of all 0 and 1. As usual bitmask
0 and 1 are respectively the zero and identity element for
&, i.e., Je&0K𝜌=0 and Je&1K𝜌=JeK𝜌.
Figure 20 presents the semantics rules for CMOV and
for the stable read command implemented using SLH.
Rule [Exec-CMOV] evaluates the condition (b= J𝜌Ke)
of the conditional assignment x := e ? :etrue : efalse and
assigns the corresponding expressions (x := eb). Rule
[Fetch-Stable-Read-SLH] fetches command x :=
stable_read(e1,e2), computes the bounds check con-
dition, the address of the indexed element, and push on
the stack the following command.
r :=e1⩽ length(e2)
if r then
r :=r ?1:0;
x :=*((base(e1)+e2)&r);
else
fail
The code above is similar to the code generated by a
regular array read, but additionally stores the result of the
Exec-CMOV
i=x :=e?:etrue :efalse b=JeK𝜌 i ′=x :=eb
⟨is1,i ,is2,cs⟩ (𝜇,𝜌,𝜖) ⟨is1++[i ′ ]++is2,cs⟩
Fetch-Stable-Read-SLH
c=x :=stable_read(e1,e2)
e=e2< length(e1) e
′=base(e1)+e2
c1=r :=e c2=r :=r ?1:0 c3=x :=*(e ′&r)
c′=c1;if r thenc2;c3 elsefail
⟨is,c :cs,𝜇,𝜌⟩ fetch−−−→𝜖 ⟨is,c′ :cs,𝜇,𝜌⟩
Figure 20. Semantics of x :=stable_read(e1,e2).
bounds-check condition in reserved variable r . In the then-
branch, the condition is then converted into a suitable
bitmask using using the non-speculative CMOV instruc-
tion i.e., r :=r ?1:0, which then masks the address loaded,
i.e., *((base(e1)+e2)& r). As a result, the value of the
address remains undefined until the processor evaluates
the bounds check condition. When the condition resolves,
if the index is inbound r=1 and the program reads the cor-
rect address Je&1K𝜌=JeK𝜌 If the index is out-of-bounds,
instead, r =0 and the load can only read speculatively
from a constant address (x :=𝜇(0)), thus closing the leak.5
Revisited Example. Consider again running example
Ex1 in Figure 3, where instead of standard array reads,
we employ the stable_read(·) primitive from above. Af-
ter fetching the program, the addresses of the loads are
masked with the respective array bounds-check condi-
tions. Assuming the same memory layout and content as
in Figure 10 (except for the fact that arrays are shifted
by one position since 𝜇(0)=0 is reserved), the processor
resolves the first bounds check and reads the array within
its bounds, i.e., x :=𝜇(3)=0. The second load attempts
to read the array out of bounds (y :=a[2]), and our coun-
termeasure prevents the buffer overrun by redirecting the
load to the dummy value stored at address 0. First, the pro-
cessor resolves the bounds check, i.e., r :=0, and forwardes
it to the load y :=load((base(a)+i2)&r). Then, the con-
dition zeros out the address and the processor assigns the
dummy value to variable y , i.e., y :=𝜇(0). As a result, we
always read array b at index z =0 and close the leak.
5We assume that the first memory cell is reserved to the processor,
which initializes it with dummy data, e.g., 𝜇(0)=0.
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C Full Type System
Constraints. Our typing judgement Γ,Prot⊢𝑠 ⇒𝑐 cre-
ates a set of constraints 𝑐. The syntax for constraints is
shown in Figure 22. The constraints relate atoms which
either represent the unknown type of a variable 𝑥 (𝛼𝑥), or
the unknown type of an expression (𝑟). Constraints record
can-flow-to relationships between the atoms and lattice
values T and S. They are accumulated via operator ∪,
where we identify 𝑐1∪···∪𝑐𝑛 with the set {𝑐1,...,𝑐𝑛}.
Solutions and Satisfiability. We define the solution
to a set of constraints as a function 𝜎 from atoms to flow
types, i.e., 𝜎∈Atoms ↦→{T,S}, and extend solutions to
map T and S to themselves. For a set of constraints 𝑐
and a solution function 𝜎, we write 𝜎⊢𝑐 to say that the
constraints 𝑐 are satisfied under solution 𝜎. The definition
of 𝜎⊢𝑐 is shown in the lower part of Figure 22. In short,
solution 𝜎 satisfies 𝑐, if all can-flow-to constraints hold,
when the atoms are replaced by their values under 𝜎. We
say that a set of constraints 𝑐 is satisfiable, if there is a
solution 𝜎 such that 𝜎⊢𝑐.
Paths.The constraints generated by our type system give
rise to the def-use graph of the type-checked program. For
a set of constraints 𝑐, we call a sequence of atoms 𝑎1...𝑎𝑛 a
path in 𝑐, if 𝑎𝑖⊑𝑎𝑖+1∈𝑐 for 𝑖∈1,...,𝑛−1 and say that 𝑎1 is
the path’s entry and 𝑎𝑛 its exit. AT-S path is a path with
entry T and exit S. A set of constraints 𝑐 is satisfiable
if and only if there is no T-S path in 𝑐, as such a path
would correspond to a derivation of false. If 𝑐 is satisfiable,
we can compute a solution 𝜎(𝑐) by letting 𝜎(𝑐)(𝑎)=T, if
there is a path with entry T and exit 𝑎, and S otherwise.
Cuts. If a set of constraints is unsatisfiable, we can make
it satisfiable by removing some of the nodes in its graph or
equivalently protecting some of the expressions. A set of
atoms𝐴 cuts a path 𝑎1...𝑎𝑛, if some 𝑎∈𝐴 occurs along the
path, i.e., there exists 𝑎∈𝐴 and 𝑖∈1,...,𝑛 such that 𝑎𝑖=𝑎.
We call 𝐴 a cut-set for a set of constraints 𝑐, if 𝐴 cuts
all T-S paths in 𝑐, and say that 𝐴 is minimal for 𝑐, if all
other cut-sets 𝐴′ contain as many or more atoms that 𝐴,
i.e., #𝐴⩽#𝐴′. The problem of finding a minimal cut-set
is an instance of them Min-Cut/Max-Flow problem, and
we can reuse existing efficient algorithms [1] to compute
a solution.
Extracting Types FromCuts.Froma set of variables𝐴
such that 𝐴 is a cut-set of constraints 𝑐, we can extract a
typing environment Γ(𝑐,𝐴) as follows: for an atom 𝛼𝑥, we
define Γ(𝑐,𝐴)(𝑥)=T, if there is a path with entry T and
exit 𝛼𝑥 in 𝑐 that is not cut by 𝐴, and let Γ(𝑐,𝐴)(𝑥)=S
otherwise.
Type Inference. To infer typing environment Γ and
protected set Prot for a statment 𝑠, we first define a
dummy environmentΓ* and protected setProt*, such that
Γ*,Prot*⊢𝑠 ⇒𝑐 holds for any statement 𝑠, and use it to
extract the set of constraints 𝑐. For this, we defineΓ* as the
environment thatmaps all variables toS, andProt* the set
of all variables.We then compute aminimal set of variables
𝐴 such that𝐴 is a cut-set of 𝑐, extract environment Γ(𝑐,𝐴)
and use𝐴 as protected set. Statement 𝑠 is then guaranteed
to type check under the inferred environment.
Proposition 2 (Type Inference). If Γ*,Prot* ⊢ 𝑠 ⇒ 𝑐
and 𝐴 is a set of variables that cut 𝑐, then Γ(𝑐,𝐴),𝐴⊢𝑠.
Remark. To infer a repair using stable_read instead
of protect, we can restrict our cut-set to only include
variables that are assigned values from an array read.
Example. Consider again Ex1 in Figure 3. The graph
defined by the constraints 𝑐, given by Γ*,Prot*⊢Ex1 ⇒𝑐
is shown in Figure 4, where we have omitted 𝛼-nodes.
The constraints are not satisfiable, since there are T-S
paths. Both {𝑥,𝑦} and {𝑧} are cut-sets, since they cut
each T-S path, however, the set {𝑧} contains only one
element and is therefore minimal. Finally, environment
Γ(𝑐,{𝑥,𝑦}) types all variables as S and Γ(𝑐,{𝑧}) types 𝑥
and 𝑦 asT and 𝑧, 𝑖1 and 𝑖2 as S, and by Proposition 2 both
Γ(𝑐,{𝑥,𝑦}),{𝑥,𝑦}⊢Ex1 and Γ(𝑐,{𝑧}),{𝑧}⊢Ex1 hold.
Example. Next, consider the following example Ex3.
𝑥 :=𝑎[𝑖]; 𝑏[𝑦] :=𝑥; if 0⩽𝑥 then 𝑧 :=𝑦 else skip
We show the corresponding graph in Figure 23. As before,
the constraints are unsatisfiable due to the path from T
to S. The set {𝑥} is a minimal cut-set producing envi-
ronment Γ(𝑐,{𝑥}) which types all variables as S. Finally,
the typing judgement Γ,{𝑥}⊢Ex3 holds, indicating that
the program is secure, given the promise that 𝑥 will be
protected.
C.1 Examples for Repair
Example.Consider againEx1 in Figure 3 from Section 2.
The cut-set shown on the right in Figure 4 produces the
repair shown in the comments of Figure 3.
Example. Consider again Ex2 and its dataflow graph
shown in Figure 23. The cut-set {𝑥} produces the repaired
program below.
𝑥 :=protect(𝑎[𝑖]); 𝑏[𝑦] :=𝑥;
if 0⩽𝑥 then 𝑧 :=𝑦 else skip
C.2 Type Inference
Our type-inference approach is based on type-constraints
satisfaction. Intuitively, type constraints restrict the types
that variables and expressions may assume in a program.
In the constraints, the possible types of variables and
expressions are represented by atoms, unknown types
of (sub-)expressions and type variables that can be in-
stantianted with any type that satisfies the constraints.
Solving these constrains requires finding a substituion, i.e.,
a mapping from atoms to concrete transient-flow type,
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Value
Γ⊢v :𝜏 ⇒∅
Var
Γ(x )=𝜏
Γ⊢x :𝜏 ⇒ 𝑥⊑𝛼𝑥
Uop
uop ∈ { length(·),base(·)} Γ⊢e :𝜏1 ⇒𝑘 𝜏1 ⊑ 𝜏
Γ⊢uop(e):𝜏 ⇒𝑘∪(𝑒⊑uop(e))
Bop
⊕ ∈ {+,⩽} Γ⊢e1 :𝜏1 ⇒ k1 Γ⊢e2 :𝜏2 ⇒ k2 𝜏1 ⊑ 𝜏 𝜏2 ⊑ 𝜏
Γ⊢e1⊕ e2 :𝜏 ⇒𝑘1∪𝑘2∪(𝑒1⊑𝑒1⊕𝑒2)∪(𝑒2⊑𝑒1⊕𝑒2)
Ptr-Read
Γ⊢e :S ⇒𝑘
Γ⊢*e :T ⇒𝑘∪(𝑒⊑S)∪(T⊑𝑒)
Array-Read
Γ⊢e1 :S ⇒𝑘1 Γ⊢e2 :S ⇒𝑘2
Γ⊢e1[e2]:T ⇒𝑘1∪𝑘2∪(𝑒1⊑S)∪(𝑒2⊑S)∪(T⊑𝑒1[𝑒2])
(a) Typing Rules for Expressions and Arrays.
Skip
Γ⊢skip ⇒∅
Fail
Γ⊢ fail ⇒∅
Seq
Γ⊢c1 ⇒𝑘1 Γ⊢c2 ⇒𝑘2
Γ⊢c1;c2 ⇒𝑘1∪𝑘2
Asgn
Γ⊢r :𝜏 ⇒𝑘 𝜏 ⊑ Γ(x )
Γ,Prot⊢x :=r ⇒𝑘∪(𝑟⊑𝑥)
Ptr-Write
Γ⊢e1 :S ⇒𝑘1 Γ⊢e2 :S ⇒𝑘2
Γ,Prot⊢*e1 :=e2 ⇒𝑘1∪𝑘2∪(𝑒1⊑S)∪(𝑒2⊑S)
Array-Write
Γ⊢e1 :S ⇒𝑘1 Γ⊢e2 :S ⇒𝑘2 Γ⊢e3 :S ⇒𝑘3
Γ,Prot⊢e1[e2]:=e3 ⇒𝑘1∪𝑘2∪𝑘3∪(𝑒1⊑S)∪(𝑒2⊑S)∪(𝑒3⊑S)
Protect
Γ⊢r :𝜏 ⇒𝑘
Γ,Prot⊢x :=protect(r) ⇒𝑘
Asgn-Prot
Γ⊢r :𝜏 ⇒𝑘 x ∈ Prot
Γ,Prot⊢x :=r ⇒𝑘∪(𝑟⊑𝑥)
Stable-Read
Γ⊢e1 :S ⇒𝑘 Γ⊢e2 :S
Γ,Prot⊢x :=stable_read(e1,e2) ⇒𝑘∪(𝑒1⊑S)∪(𝑒2⊑S)
If-Then-Else
Γ⊢e :S ⇒𝑘 Γ,Prot⊢c1 ⇒𝑘1 Γ,Prot⊢c2 ⇒𝑘2
Γ,Prot⊢ if e thenc1 elsec2 ⇒𝑘∪𝑘1∪𝑘2∪(𝑒⊑S)
While
Γ⊢e :S ⇒𝑘1 Γ,Prot⊢c ⇒𝑘2
Γ,Prot⊢whileedoc ⇒𝑘1∪𝑘2∪(𝑒⊑S)
(b) Typing Rules fo Commands.
Figure 21. Transient flow type system and type constraints generation .
such that all constraints are satisfied if we instantiate the
atoms with their type.
Type inference consists of 3 steps: (i) generate a set
of constraints under an initial typing environment and
protected set that under-approximates the solution of
the constraints, (ii) construct the def-use graph from the
constraints and find a cut-set, and (iii) cut the transient-
to-stable dataflows in the graph and compute the resulting
typing environment.
Constraint Generation.We describe the generation of
constraints through the typing judgment from Figure 13.6
Given a typing environment Γ, a protected set Prot, the
judgment Γ,Prot ⊢ r ⇒ k type checks r and generates
type constraints k . The syntax for constraints is shown
in Figure 14. Constraints are sets of can-flow-to relations
involving concrete types (S and T) and atoms, i.e., type
6For space reasons, the constraints generation is reported next
to the typing judgment, but we remark that these are two
distinct judgments. In particular the type-constraints generation
judgment ignores the set of protected variables Prot, but to avoid
confusion we include it in the judgment anyway.
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Atom 𝑎 ::= 𝛼𝑥 |𝑟
Constraint 𝑘 ::= 𝑎⊑S |T⊑𝑎
𝑎⊑𝑎 |𝑘∪𝑘 |∅
Solution 𝜎 ∈ Atoms ↦→{S,T}
𝜎(S)=S 𝜎(T)=T
Sol-Transient
T⊑𝜎(𝑎2)
𝜎⊢T⊑𝑎2
Sol-Stable
𝜎(𝑎1)⊑S
𝜎⊢𝑎1⊑S
Sol-Flow
𝜎(𝑎1)⊑𝜎(𝑎2)
𝜎⊢𝑎1⊑𝑎2
Sol-Set
𝜎⊢𝑐1 ... 𝜎⊢𝑐𝑛
𝜎⊢{𝑐1,...,𝑐𝑛}
Figure 22. Type Constraints and Satisfiability.
T
𝑏[𝑦]
𝑎[𝑖] 𝑥 0⩽𝑥 S
𝑦𝑧
𝑖
Figure 23. Dataflow graph of Ex3. The minimal cut-set
is shown using a dotted line.
variables corresponding to program variables (e.g., 𝛼x for
x ) and unknown types for expressions (e.g., r). In rule
[Var], constraint x ⊑ 𝛼x indicates that the type variable
of x should be at least as transitive as the unknown type of
x . This ensures that, if variable x is transient, then 𝛼x can
only be instantiated with type T. Rule [Bop] generates
constraints e1 ⊑ e1 ⊕ e2 and e2 ⊑ e1 ⊕ e2 to reflect the
fact that the unknown type of e1⊕ e2 should be at least
as transitive as the (unknown) type of e1 and e2. Notice
that these constraints correspond exactly to the premises
𝜏1 ⊑ 𝜏 and 𝜏2 ⊑ 𝜏 of the same rule. Similarly, rule [Array-
Read] generates constraints e1 ⊑ S and e2 ⊑ S for the
unknown type of the array and the index respectively. In
addition to these, the rule generates also the constraint
T⊑ e1[e2], which forces the type of e1[e2] to be transient .
Rule [Asgn] and [Asgn-Prot] generate the same con-
straint r ⊑ x because we ignore the protected set during
constraint generation, as explained in the footnote. In
contrast, rule [Protect] does not generate the constraint
r ⊑ x because r is explicitly protected. In the other rules,
the constraints are generated following a similar scheme.
From the set of constraints, we can construct the use-def
graph of the program as outlined in Section 2.3. We refer
Appendix C for a formal account of the mathematical
construction.
Type Inference.To perform type inference on a program
c, we first generate a set of constraints k using the judg-
ment described above, with appropriate initial values for
the typing environment and the protected set. Specifically,
we start with an environment that types all variables as
stable, i.e., Γ*=𝜆x .S and include all variables in the cut-
set, i.e., Prot*=Vars(c) and generate a set of constraints
k for c, i.e., Γ*,Prot*⊢c⇒k . From the constraints k , we
construct the def-graph and compute a cut-set Prot, e.g.,
by applying the Min-Cut/Max-Flow algorithm. Then,
from the cut-set Prot and the program c, we compute a
substitution that solves the constraints k , as follows. We
remove from the graph all nodes in the cut-set Prot (and
their corresponding edges), and type all variables reach-
able from node T as transient , and all other variables
as stable. We update the initial typing environment with
these type assignments and obtain the resulting environ-
ment Γ. Under new environment Γ and protected set Prot,
the unrepaired program type checks, i.e., Γ,Prot⊢c.
D Proofs
D.1 Security
In the following, we write Γ ⊢ C to indicate that the
program being executed on the processor is well-typed
according to the transient-flow type-system.
Non-Speculative Projection of Observations.Func-
tion O↓ computes the non-speculative projection of ob-
servations O . To do that, it applies function 𝐶(o,ps)
pointwise. Function 𝐶(o,ps) takes as input a single obser-
vation o and ps , a set of identifiers of mispredicted guards.
The function then removes prediction identifiers from ob-
servations correctly speculated and replaces mispredicted
load, store and rollbacks with the empty observation 𝜖.
Function𝑅(O) collects the identifiers of rollbacked guards
from events rollback(p).
𝑅(O)={p | rollback(·)(p) ∈O }
𝐶(load(n,ps1),ps2)
|ps1 ∩ ps2≡∅= load(n)
|otherwise=𝜖
𝐶(store(n,ps1),ps2)
|ps1 ∩ ps2≡∅=store(n)
|otherwise=𝜖
𝐶(rollback(p)),ps)=𝜖
𝐶(o, )=o
O↓={𝐶(o,𝑅(O)) | o ∈O }
Definition 2 (L-equivalence). Two configurations C1 =
⟨is1,cs1,𝜇1,𝜌1⟩ and C2=⟨is2,cs2,𝜇2,𝜌2⟩ are L-equivalent,
if and only if is1= is2, cs1=cs2, 𝜇1≈L𝜇2, and 𝜌1≈L 𝜌2.
Lemma D.1 (L-equivalence 1-step preservation). Let
ps be the set of guard identifiers rollbacked in the rest
of the execution of well-typed configurations Γ⊢C1 and
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Skip
⟨𝜇,𝜌⟩⇓skip𝜖 ⟨𝜇,𝜌⟩
Fail
⟨𝜇,𝜌⟩⇓failfail ⟨𝜇,𝜌⟩
Asgn
v=JeK𝜌
⟨𝜇,𝜌⟩⇓(x :=e)𝜖 ⟨𝜇,𝜌[x ↦→v ]⟩
Ptr-Read
n=JeK𝜌 v=𝜇(n)
⟨𝜇,𝜌⟩⇓(x :=*e)read(n) ⟨𝜇,𝜌[x ↦→v ]⟩
Array-Read
a=Je1K𝜌 n=Je2K𝜌 n⩽ length(a) n ′=base (a)+n v=𝜇(n ′)
⟨𝜇,𝜌⟩⇓(x :=e1[e2])read(n′) ⟨𝜇,𝜌[x ↦→v ]⟩
Array-Read-Fail
a=Je1K𝜌 n=Je2K𝜌 n> length(a)
⟨𝜇,𝜌⟩⇓(x :=e1[e2])fail ⟨𝜇,𝜌⟩
Ptr-Write
n=Je1K𝜌 v=Je2K𝜌
⟨𝜇,𝜌⟩⇓(*e1:=e2)read(n′) ⟨𝜇[n ↦→v ],𝜌⟩
Array-Write
a=Je1K𝜌 n=Je2K𝜌 v=Je3K𝜌 n⩽ length(a) n ′=base(a)+n
⟨𝜇,𝜌⟩⇓(e1[e2]:=e3)write(n′) ⟨𝜇[n ′ ↦→v ],𝜌⟩
Array-Write-Fail
a=Je1K𝜌 n=Je2K𝜌 n> length(a)
⟨𝜇,𝜌⟩⇓(e1[e2]:=e3)fail ⟨𝜇,𝜌⟩
Protect
⟨𝜇,𝜌⟩⇓(x :=r)O ⟨𝜇,𝜌′⟩
⟨𝜇,𝜌⟩⇓(x :=protect(r))O ⟨𝜇,𝜌′⟩
Stable-Read
⟨𝜇,𝜌′⟩(⇓(x :=e1[e2])O ⟨𝜇,𝜌′⟩
⟨𝜇,𝜌⟩⇓(x :=stable_read(e1,e2))O ⟨𝜇,𝜌′⟩
If-Then-Else
b=JeK𝜌 ⟨𝜇,𝜌⟩⇓cbO ⟨𝜇′,𝜌′⟩
⟨𝜇,𝜌⟩⇓(if e thenctrue elsecfalse)O ⟨𝜇′,𝜌′⟩
While
c′= if b then(whileedoc)elseskip ⟨𝜇,𝜌⟩⇓c′O ⟨𝜇′,𝜌′⟩
⟨𝜇,𝜌⟩⇓(whileedoc)O ⟨𝜇′,𝜌′⟩
Seq
⟨𝜇,𝜌⟩⇓c1O1 ⟨𝜇′,𝜌′⟩ fail ̸∈O1 ⟨𝜇′,𝜌′⟩⇓c2O2 ⟨𝜇′′,𝜌′′⟩
⟨𝜇,𝜌⟩⇓(c1;c2)(O1.O2) ⟨𝜇′′,𝜌′′⟩
Seq-Fail
⟨𝜇,𝜌⟩⇓c1O1 ⟨𝜇′,𝜌′⟩ fail ∈O1
⟨𝜇,𝜌⟩⇓(c1;c2)O1 ⟨𝜇′,𝜌′⟩
Figure 24. Sequential big-step semantics with observations.
Done
⟨[ ],[ ],𝜇,𝜌⟩⇓[ ]𝜖 ⟨[ ],[ ],𝜇,𝜌⟩
Step
⟨is,cs,𝜇,𝜌⟩ d−→o ⟨is ′,cs ′,𝜇′,𝜌′⟩
⟨is ′,cs ′,𝜇′,𝜌′⟩⇓DO ⟨is ′′,cs ′′,𝜇′′,𝜌′′⟩
⟨is,cs,𝜇,𝜌⟩⇓(d:D)(o.O) ⟨is ′′,cs ′′,𝜇′′,𝜌′′⟩
Figure 25. Speculative big-step semantics.
Γ⊢C2. If C1≈LC2 and C1 d−→o1 C ′1 and C2 d−→o2 C ′2, if
𝐶(o1 ,ps)=𝐶(o2 ,ps), then o1 =o2 .
Proof. By case analysis on the two small-step reductions.
Since C1≈LC2, then their reorder buffer and commands
stack are equal, i.e., is1 = is2 and cs1 = cs2. Thus, the
two configurations execute the process the same instruc-
tion in the same stage. All the instructions that generate
the empty observation 𝜖 or fail are trivial. This include
all the rules in the fetch and in the retire stage. The
interesting cases that can leak occur speculatively and out-
of-order, i.e., the n stage. By inspecting rule [Execute],
we notice both configurations execute the same n-th
instruction from the attacker supplied directive and
with L-equivalent transient variable maps, (𝜑(is,𝜌1)≈L
𝜑(is,𝜌2) from 𝜌1 ≈L 𝜌1). Then, we consider the instruc-
tions that can leak during the execute stage: guards
guard (eb ,cs,p), loads x :=load(e), and stores store(n,e).
The guard instruction can result in a rollback (rule [Exec-
Branch-Mispredict]) or resolved successfully (rule
[Exec-Branch-Ok]) If the two execution differ the at-
tacker gains information by observing a rollback((p))
or not (e.g., through the data cache). We show that this
cannot happen because the guard expression is typed S.
Automatically Eliminating Speculative Leaks with BLADE Conference, 2020
We need to prove JeK𝜌1=JeK𝜌2 , with 𝜌1≈L 𝜌2. If e con-
tains a secret variable, then JeK𝜌1 ̸≡ JeK𝜌2 , however the
secret value would be leaked during sequential execution
as well, i.e., it contradicts the hyptothesis 𝐶(o1 ,ps) =
𝐶(o2 ,ps). If e contains only public variables, the outcome
of the two conditions may still differ. In particular tran-
sient secrets may taint public variables and from there
transimtted to the condition through the transient func-
tionmap. However, by the rules of our type systemΓ⊢e :S,
which means that there must be a protect(·) in between
the transient source and the stable sink. Since protect(·)
forbids values forwarding, the value of the condition is
undefined e(𝜌1) = e(𝜌2) = bot and this case is void.
The reasoning for rules [Exec-Load] and [Exec-
Store-Value] is similar.
□
Theorem D.2 (Soundness). For all programs c, if Γ⊢c
then c satisfies speculative non-interference.
Proof. Let 𝜇1 and 𝜇2 be memories such that 𝜇1≈L and 𝜇2
and similarly 𝜌1 and 𝜌2 variables map such that 𝜌1≈L 𝜌2.
Let Ci = ⟨[ ], [c ],𝜇i ,𝜌i⟩ for i ∈ {1,2} and let D be a
valid schedule such that C1 ⇓DO1 C ′1 and C2 ⇓DO2 C ′2. We
now assume O1↓= O2↓ and show that O1 = O2 by in-
duction on the typing judgment. The base case ([Done])
is trivial. In the inductive case, we two pairs of small
and big steps: reductions. A pair of small-step reductions
⟨is i ,cs i , 𝜇i , 𝜌i⟩ d−→oi ⟨is ′i ,cs ′i , 𝜇′i , 𝜌′i⟩ and a pair of big-
step reductions ⟨is ′i ,cs ′i ,𝜇′i ,𝜌′i⟩⇓DOi ⟨is ′′i ,cs ′′i ,𝜇′′i ,𝜌′′i ⟩ for
i ∈ {1,2}. Assuming that the program does not leak se-
quentially, we have o1↓=o2↓ and O1↓=O2↓. By induction
hypothesis on the big-step we obtain O1=O2 and derive
o1 =o2 by Lemma D.1 applied to small-step reductions
and the set of mispredicted guard identifiers 𝑅(O1).
□
